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Consumers may become aware of products and their characteristics either passively or ac-
tively. While passive awareness may arise through conversations with friends or consumption
of advertising, active awareness occurs through a process of canvassing sellers. Consumers
often refer to this activity as browsing or shopping; economists refer to this activity as search.
This dissertation begins with a summary of the current economic models of consumer
search and the econometric methods used to estimate those models. An emphasis will be
placed on models that assume consumers search sequentially for product fit, as opposed to
non-sequential search or search for observable product characteristics such as price. The
bulk of this dissertation then provides an empirical analysis of consumer search through
which I demonstrate identification of – and provide a first estimation of – a key parame-
ter in sequential search models, the standard deviation of product fit. I devote separate
chapters to detailed explanations of the data acquired for the analysis; the model, its es-
timation, and identification of this key parameter; and important post-estimation analysis
including an assessment of model fit, calculations of consumer surplus and price elasticities,
ii
and implementation of counterfactual analyses.
The setting of my empirical analysis is the U.S. automotive market. I assemble a unique
data set containing individual-level smartphone geolocation data that inform me about deal-
ership visits which I combine with proprietary DMV registration data that inform me of new
vehicle purchases. I model consumers’ dealership visits and purchase decisions using a dis-
crete choice model of demand with optimal sequential search for product fit. In these models,
the benefit of searching is measured by the standard deviation of the product fit. This benefit
is parametrically identified by the functional form of the match-value, but in practice it is
difficult to jointly estimate along with consumer search costs. I use the distance a consumer
must travel to visit a dealership as an exogenous search cost shifter, which enables me to
identify and estimate the standard deviation of the product fit. My results show that the
benefit provided by dealerships to consumers is substantial and that failure to estimate the
standard deviation of the product fit leads to biased estimates of search costs and consumer
surplus, as well as to inaccurate predictions regarding the number of searches that con-
sumers conduct. These effects can impact managerial decisions, as demonstrated through
my counterfactual analyses.
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CHAPTER 1
Academic Literature
1.1 Structural Models of Consumer Search
Early economic models assume consumers have full information. That is, all consumers are
perfectly informed about all attributes of all products at all times. While convenient for
modeling basic features of a market, such an assumption is clearly unrealistic. Consumers
may have some information about some products, and if they wish to know more, they must
expend effort to gather additional information. Understanding how consumers search for
products and eventually chose a product to purchase is the subject of a growing literature
in economics and marketing.
This literature has roots in empirical observations about firms and consumers that con-
tradict the full information assumption. In economics, consumer search dates back to the
classic work of Stigler (1961) who reported the presence and persistence of price dispersion
of homogeneous goods. As emphasized by the “paradox” presented in Diamond (1971),
firms will not rationally set different prices of a homogeneous good if they face demand from
fully-informed consumers because, in such a case, all consumers would purchase from the
low-priced firm. One explanation, therefore, is that consumers are not fully informed and
must search to gain additional information. In marketing, consumer search was first explored
in the context of analyzing consumers’ consideration sets. The pioneering work of Hauser
and Wernerfelt (1990) and Roberts and Lattin (1991) reported that consumers consider only
a small fraction of available alternatives, indicating that it may be too costly for consumers
1
to become fully informed.
The observed price-setting behavior of firms and the limited consideration set sizes re-
ported by consumers motivated the development of models that could rationalize both price
dispersion and inexhaustive search.1 Among the structural econometric models based on
those economic models of consumer search, a delineation is often made over what the con-
sumer is searching for and the method of search. The following two sections address each in
turn. Other important considerations for these models involve product differentiation (i.e.,
are products homogeneous, or vertically and/or horizontally differentiated?) and the unit of
analysis (i.e., do the data capture individual-level behavior or market-wide relationships?).
These considerations will be addressed in my review of the estimation approaches and empir-
ical applications of search models in Section 1.2.2. I close this chapter with a review of recent
extensions to the standard search models in Section 1.3 and a summary of the application
of these models to the auto industry in Section 1.4. See Honka, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest
(2019) for an additional contemporary review of structural search model in economics and
marketing.
1.1.1 What the Consumer Searches For
Structural econometric models of consumer search follow the discrete choice random util-
ity framework popular in demand estimation (see, e.g., Train (2009)), where the consumer
chooses to consume the (known or searched) product offering her the highest utility. How-
ever, unlike the classic discrete choice model where the consumer is assumed to have full
information, in a structural econometric search model the consumer must search to resolve
her uncertainty about the product (and commonly chooses only from among those products
searched). From the perspective of the consumer, it matters little what product feature (or
set of features) has uncertainty and is to be resolved through search. However, the distinc-
1Baye et al. (2006), Ratchford et al. (2008), Armstrong (2017), and Anderson, Renault et al. (2018)
provide comprehensive surveys of the theoretical research on consumer search.
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tion is important to the researcher, who either observes or does not observe the feature(s)
over which the consumer searches.
The classic example of search for an observable (to the researcher) feature is a homoge-
neous product market where the consumer must search to discover the price of the product
at each retailer, as in Stigler (1961) who considers commodity product markets and McCall
(1970) who models job offers for unemployed workers as a function of only the wage. A
recent example that analyzes search over a set of product features can be found in Chen
and Yao (2017), who assess consumer search for hotels on an online booking platform and
model the click-through from the page of search results to a specific product listing as the
revelation of a large set of hotel characteristics, including price, star rating, and distance to
the city center, among others.
In contrast, a consumer may search over one or more product features unobserved by
the researcher. Such a situation is referred to as the consumer’s search for “product fit”
or “match value” following the concept introduced in Wolinsky (1986). This framework is
most appropriate when modeling consumer search for horizontally differentiated products or
products with components that are difficult to measure and (possibly) differ across purchase
occasions. For example, Dong et al. (2020) model consumer search for cosmetic moisturizers,
the purchase of which may depend on the dryness, sensitivity, and texture of the consumer’s
skin at the time of purchase – all important considerations when choosing a moisturizer, but
very difficult to capture in data. As a second example, in the subsequent chapters of this
dissertation, I model consumer search for a new car, the choice of which may depend on how
much the consumer likes the look of the vehicle, her comfort in it, or how courteous and
helpful the dealership staff is during her dealership visit.
The distinction among whether the searched features are observable to the researcher
significantly impacts the formulation and estimation of the model. In addition, and impor-
tantly, observing the searched features also enables the researcher to distinguish between
the two most commonly assumed methods of search (simultaneous and sequential, discussed
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next). For example, De los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest (2012) uses price data from
online book retailers to determine that consumers follow the simultaneous search method;
Honka and Chintagunta (2017) find a similar result when analyzing price search for auto
insurance. The results from both studies rely on the pattern and search-length of observed
price realizations relative to the market-wide distribution of prices, an approach unavailable
with an unobserved product characteristic, such as match value.
1.1.2 How the Consumer Searches
As just alluded to, structural econometric models of consumer search often assume one of two
search methods: a sequential search method or a non-sequential search method. The latter
is commonly referred to as a fixed-sample size or simultaneous2 search method. Under the
latter method, consumers commit to searching a fixed set of products before they begin their
search process, whereas under a sequential search method, the consumer decides after each
successive search occasion whether continue searching or to stop searching and purchase a
product.3 Often the empirical setting dictates the assumed method of search. For example,
simultaneous search fits the situation of high school students applying to college because
(typically) all college applications are submitted prior to the student learning her admission
decisions; sequential search better represents a hungry consumer at a food court who, upon
observing the offerings of one dining establishment may elect to view the next or to stop and
place her lunch order.
Each method offers its own estimation challenges. Under simultaneous search, the con-
sumer identifies the subset of products that maximizes his expected maximum utility. This
2Note that simultaneous search does not mean that all products are sampled simultaneously, but rather
that the consumer commits to sample all products prior to making her purchase decision.
3Hybrid theoretical models of sequential search occasions where multiple products may be simultaneous
searched on each occasion have been presented. Morgan and Manning (1985) show that this combination
dominates either pure simultaneous or pure sequential search. However, I am not aware of any empirical
research that has discovered how to take their hybrid search model to data.
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involves enumeration of all combinatorically possible subsets of products to search, the com-
plexity of which grows exponentially with the number of available products. Specifically, for
J available products, the number of search sets is 2J . Researchers have circumvented this
curse of dimensionality by assessing markets with relatively few products (e.g., Mehta, Rajiv,
and Srinivasan (2003)) or making assumptions about first-order or second-order stochastic
dominance among the utility distributions, as in Vishwanath (1992) and Chade and Smith
(2006). The latter approach reduces the complexity of the calculation to one that grows
linearly with the number of potentially searchable products (the number of search sets is J),
making the computations feasible for a large number of products but at the cost of inter-
pretability. Honka (2014) demonstrates that the same reduction in complexity is achievable
by assuming that the means or variances of the utility distribution are identical, which better
connects the necessary mathematical assumptions used to circumvent the curse of dimen-
sionality to plausible aspects of the price distribution in the product market. In addition, it
is worth noting that no study has yet empirically analyzed simultaneous search for product
fit and there may be challenges to such an implementation that are yet to be discovered.
Under sequential search, the consumer faces a dynamic utility optimization problem. At
each step in the search sequence, the consumer must decide whether to stop searching and
purchase among the searched products, or to continue searching acting optimally in the
subsequent period. This problem was famously solved and simplified by Weitzman (1979),
who shows that each product can be assigned an index value (commonly referred to as
a reservation utility value) that facilitates optimal behavior via three decision rules: the
consumer continues searches in decreasing order of reservation utility values (the Selection
Rule) until a realized utility value exceeds the best outstanding reservation utility value
(the Stopping Rule), at which time the consumer stops searching and purchases the product
with the best realized utility value (the Choice Rule). As a result of Weitzman’s rules,
the computation complexity of sequential search models is substantially reduced. However,
the researcher must still calculate reservation utility values and fit the observed search and
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purchase behavior of consumers to Weitzman’s rules, as discussed in the next section.
It is worth noting that, for either method, the computational complexity is impacted
by the informativeness of the data. For example, in Honka and Chintagunta (2017) where
the authors estimate a sequential price-search model, the data reveal only which products
were searched, but not the order of search. This yields another combinatorically challenging
problem of order K! (where K is the number of observed searches by the consumer), albeit
generally milder than initial problem of determining search set inclusion encountered in the
simultaneous search model of order 2J , but daunting nonetheless for any observed search
sequences of substantial length. By contrast, when the researcher observes the order of
search in a model characterized by Weitzman’s rules, there are only J possible search sets
because the order of search is known. Moreover, once the number of searches is determined,
there is only the one realized search path and thus no curse of dimensionality.
1.2 Sequential Search for Product Fit
Sequential search is the modeling approach taken in subsequent chapters of this dissertation
and thus will be the focus of the majority of the remaining literature review in this chapter.
Emphasis is placed on estimation approaches rather than specific applications or empirical
results.
1.2.1 Model Specification
To fix ideas, I first recount the theoretical model of Weitzman (1979) and subsequently ex-
pand the framework to the econometric specification of Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg
(2010).
Weitzman (1979) supposes there are j = 1, . . . , J available products with utility uj drawn
from probability distributions Fj(uj) along with a “fallback” reward of u0 = 0 if no alterna-
tive is selected. Discovering product j’s utility costs cj. The consumer’s goal is to maximize
6
the expected net utility, which is the product’s gross utility less the sum of the search costs
incurred. As indicated above, optimal consumer behavior follows the three Weitzman rules,
which depend on an index value known as a reservation utility. The reservation utility (zj) is
implicitly defined as the value that equates the marginal benefit and marginal cost of search:
∫ ∞
zj
u fj(u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Benefit
= cj︸︷︷︸
Marg. Cost
(1.1)
The result from Weitzman (1979) is powerful because it facilitates analysis of differenti-
ated products (and simplifies to handle homogenous products as well). For example, each
product may be differentiated in its before-search observable value by specifying utility as
uj = δj + εj (1.2)
with δj known to the consumer or it may be differentiated by a product-specific search
cost cj. In addition or alternatively, each realized value may result from a product-specific
distribution fj(uj), where greater mass in the upper tail of fj(uj) results in higher reservation
values zj (holding everything else constant).
Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) take the Weitzman (1979) framework to
data, allowing product utilities and search costs to be individual specific (i.e., uij and cij).
They specify the component of utility known prior to search (δij) as a combination of product
features (xj) and individual-specific preference parameters (βi):
uij = x
′
jβi + εij (1.3)
Search costs are modeled as a lognormally distributed random effect, with wj a vector
of cost attributes and γi a vector of individual-specific search-cost sensitivity parameters:
cij = wj
′γi.
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In addition, the authors assume that match-value realizations for all consumers and
all products are drawn from independent and identically distributed normal distributions
(εij ∼ N (0, σ2ij)) where they fix σij = 1 (in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I
show that this is not necessary, particularly when the researcher has access to an exogenous
cost-shifting variable). Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) show how to calculate
reservation utilities under the assumption of normally distributed match-values. They first
equate expected marginal benefit to marginal cost following Equation (1.1), which can be
integrated given the normal distributional assumption to yield
cij
σij
= φ(ζij) + ζij (1− Φ(ζij)) (1.4)
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the normal probability density function and cumulative distribution
function, respectively. And second, they implicitly solve Equation (1.4) for ζij and use ζij to
recover reservation utilities through the relationship
zij = δij + ζijσij. (1.5)
The framework provided by Weitzman (1979) and Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnen-
berg (2010) underlies contemporary research on the estimation and application of structural
econometric models of sequential search.
1.2.2 Methods of Estimation and Empirical Applications
Unique data sets and advances in estimation approaches have resulted in numerous methods
by which to fit variants of the model presented in Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg
(2010). In this section, I review many of them.
8
Crude Frequency MSLE
Chen and Yao (2017) analyze click-stream data of online hotel bookings provided by
a travel website. In their sequential search model, consumers search for attribute levels
(not match values) by using refinement tools on the website and by clicking through to
product-specific webpages. To make the multi-attribute search model tractable, consumer
are assumed to know the joint multivariate-distribution of the combination of the website’s
refinement methods and the hotels’ attributes. With the exception of what the consumer is
searching for, the model of Chen and Yao (2017) closely follows the Kim, Albuquerque, and
Bronnenberg (2010) framework presented above.
To estimate the model, the authors construct the likelihood function, decomposing the
joint probability of search and purchase into the marginal probability of search and the
conditional probability of purchase given search. Let j∗ denote the purchased product and
Sij denote the set of searched alternatives by consumer i prior to searching product j, then
the likelihood is
L =
N∏
i=1
Pr
i
(purchase|search)× Pr
i
(search)
=
N∏
i=1
(
Pr
i
(uij∗ ≥ uij, ∀j ∈ Si)
)
×
(
Pr
i
(zij ≥ uir, ∀r ∈ Sij)× Pr(zij ≥ zit, ∀t /∈ Sij)
)
(1.6)
In words, the likelihood function is the mathematical representation of Weitzman’s rules.
The first term in the second line is the probability that the chosen alternative has the
maximum utility among all searched alternatives (Weitzman’s Choice Rule). The second
term is the probability on each search occasion that the searched alternative’s reservation
utility exceeds the realized utility values of all products searched before it (Weitzman’s
Continuation/Stopping Rule). And the third term is the probability that the reservation
utility of the product searched on each search occasion exceeds the reservation utilities of all
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other unsearched products (Weitzman’s Selection Rule).
The authors proceed with simulated maximum likelihood estimation. The simulation is
carried out by the crude frequency approach. Specifically, for each consumer, the authors
draw a 100 length-P vectors of values for the P random coefficient parameters (βi and
γi). For each of those 100 vectors, the authors draw 50 length-K vectors of values for the
unobserved preference component εi (recall |Si| = Ki). Because, from the perspective of
the researcher, the set of searched alternatives is known, each vector of εi is drawn from
a truncated normal distribution where truncation depends on the values of the reservation
utilities for the search products. With the sets of draws in hand for one consumer, the
individual likelihood is simply the percentage of time that the Choice and Selection Rules
hold.4
While results from the author’s simulation study demonstrate effective parameter recov-
ery using the crude frequency simulation approach, it is worth noting that, in general, the
parameter space of most sequential search models is high-dimensional such that very few
draws may satisfy the conditions set forth in the Weitzman Rules, and thus an extremely
large (perhaps computationally infeasible) number of draws may be required to obtain ac-
curate parameter estimates.
Chen and Yao (2017) use exclusions restrictions to separately estimate utility and search
cost parameters (an approach I follow in later chapters of this dissertation). In their ap-
proach, indirect utility is a function of hotel characteristics and price while search costs are
a function of the consumer’s time constraint (measured by days until check-in) and hotel
“slot” position on the website’s page of search results. Chen and Yao (2017) find that con-
sumer ratings a large impact on consumer utility and that search costs are significant. They
also find that consumers demonstrate considerable variation in preference and search cost,
4As footnoted in Chen and Yao (2017) and expanded upon in Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg
(2017), the truncation in the probability of purchase given search implies that the Stopping Rule holds and
thus does not need to be calculated separately.
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as measured by high dispersion in the distributions of individual-level coefficients, and that
the website’s refinement tools (e.g., filtering or ordering search results) make the market less
concentrated because they help heterogeneous consumers find hotels that match their pref-
erences better; matches that would be too costly without refinement tools. They use their
fitted model to assess the effect of the website’s refinement tools on consumer welfare and
show that refinement tools lead to consumers making more searches and achieving higher
gross utility, but that overall consumer welfare (net utility, or gross utility net of search costs)
may decrease as consumers disproportionately make excessive searches using the refinement
tools.
Logit-Smoothed Accept/Reject MSLE
Consumer search for online hotel bookings are also investigated in Ursu (2018). The
author assesses how rankings affect search when the rankings are endogenous (consumers
pay more attention to highly ranked products, and the booking platform ranks the most
relevant products at the top). To handle the endogeneity, she utilizes a field experiment run
by the booking platform that exogenously varies hotel rankings on the website.
Ursu (2018) follows the sequential search for product fit modeling framework of Kim,
Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010). Unlike Chen and Yao (2017), however, Ursu (2018)
employs a logit-smoother accept/reject simulator to estimate the model via maximum sim-
ulated likelihood. She specifies the individual likelihood as the joint probability that Weitz-
man’s Selection, Stopping, and Choice Rules hold:
Li = Pr
(
uij∗ ≥ uij, ∀j ∈ Si
⋂
zij ≥ uir, ∀r ∈ Sij
⋂
zij ≥ zit, ∀t /∈ Sij
)
=
∫
I(conditions)φ(ε) dε
(1.7)
Estimation proceeds by re-writing each of the three conditions as an expression that is
greater than zero when the condition is met (e.g., the Choice Rule is expressed as ν1 =
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uij∗ −maxj∈S uij ≥ 0) and feeding the conditions into the logit formula:
Lqi =
1
1 +
∑3
l=1 e
−νqilλ
(1.8)
where q indexes the random draws and λ is a scaling parameter that controls the “smooth-
ness” of the logit transformation. High λ values shape the logit function as a stair-step and
thus have limited smoothing while low λ yield a gentle slope with substantial smoothing.
The simulated likelihood for one consumer is then the average of the logit-smoothed value
across draws: Li = Q
−1∑Q
q=1 L
q
i .
Smoothing in the simulated maximum likelihood calculation facilitates optimization by a
gradient-based optimizer that would otherwise struggle or fail when faced with the discrete
jumps in likelihood values that result from small changes in parameters. These jumps occur
at the threshold when parameter values result in a reordering of reservation utilities or
different choices (j∗) among searched alternatives.
Ursu (2018) uses the logit-smoothed accept/reject simulated maximum likelihood method
to estimate her model with exogenous ranking variation. She finds a lower position effect (i.e.,
that it is less costly for a consumer to look further down the list of Expedia’s search results)
than most other hotel industry literature. She uses her model to assess the effect of changing
the ranking scheme on the website to a utility-based ranking. Under this counterfactual,
consumers search less yet are better-matched with hotels that align with their preferences,
leading to large improvements in consumer welfare. This finding demonstrates the large
potential positive effect on consumer welfare achievable through better product ranking, and
emphasizes the usefulness of random variation in product ranking in order for intermediaries
to learn about their consumers and improve their product offering.
GHK Simulation Used in MSLE
Jiang et al. (2019) use a structural sequential search model to study retargeting ad-
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vertising effectiveness. While their framework builds upon the modeling approach of Kim,
Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010), their estimation approach cleverly relies on the GHK
importance sampling method of Geweke, Keane, and Runkle (1994). Specifically, the au-
thors estimate their sequential search model by first iteratively drawing values of βi from
truncated normal distributions, where truncation results from Weitzman’s Selection Rule
(i.e., zij ≥ zi,j+1 implies that δi,j ≥ δi,j+1, thereby imposing restrictions on plausible values
of βi in order to match the observed search sequence in the data). Having satisfied the Search
Rule, the authors then iteratively draw values of εij to satisfy the Continuation and Choice
Rules.
As with the logit-smoothed accept/reject simulation approach used in Ursu (2018),
the simulated likelihood function using the GHK method proposed by Jiang et al. (2019)
is smooth and differentiable, and thus amenable to optimization with gradient-based ap-
proaches. In addition, the GHK method can obtain an approximation of the likelihood
function with high accuracy without requiring a large number of draws, even when the di-
mensionality of integration is high.5 This is a substantial benefit and will likely lead to
wide adoption of this method in future research employing a maximum simulated likelihood
estimation approach.
The empirical setting for Jiang et al. (2019) is the Chinese consumer-to-consumer retail
platform Taobao, which did not employ retargeting advertising during the study period.
The authors assess two potential retargeting marketing strategies: coupons and seller rec-
ommendations. Their counterfactual results show coupons to be less effective than seller
recommendations, but that both strategies are effective at increasing sales from consumers
that appear to have abandoned the focal product. They then show how an auction pricing
mechanism for retargeting advertising could be used by Taobao to redistribute profits from
retargeted consumers between sellers on the platform and the platform host.
5Chung, Chintagunta, and Misra (2019) compare the accuracy of the crude frequency, logit-smoothed,
and GHK methods of estimating the sequential search model and find that the GHK method performs best.
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Sequential Search with Aggregate Data
Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) study online search for digital camcorders
at Amazon.com using only view-rank data for estimation. For any focal product, the data
provide all other camcorder products ranked by frequency of same-session viewing with the
focal product. Thus, although the data are aggregate, they provide a complex pattern of
relationships between products.
To estimate the model, the authors use non-linear least squares on a large set of rank
inequalities. In order to do so, the authors first compute the “inclusions probability” for a
given product j. Product j will be in the consumer’s searched set Si if the first j − 1 draws
of εij result in uik < zij for k < j. Denote this inclusion probability of such an occurrence as
piij. Now, given the sequential nature of search according to Weitzman’s Selection Rule, the
probability that products j and j+l occur together in a searched set is simply the probability
that later-to-be-searched product j + l is in the set; for an arbitrarily ranked product k, the
inclusion probability of both j and k is pii,jk = min{piij, piik}.
The authors then create the commonality index CIjk for the two products j and k as the
ratio
CIjk =
njk√
nj
√
nk
(1.9)
where nij is the number of consumers who searched both products j and k, calculated as
nij =
∑N
i=1 pii,jk (and analogously for nj and nk). The functional form of the index is designed
to match the view-rank algorithm employed by Amazon.com.
Finally, the authors create an indicator variable Ij,kl if the estimated commonality index
ordering CIjk > CIjl matches the observed pairwise ordering in the view rank data (j, k) >
(j, l). Estimation then proceeds by non-linear least squares, where the objective function to
minimize ∑
(j,k,l)∈S
[Pr(Ij,kl = 1)− 1]2 (1.10)
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Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) demonstrates that aggregate view-rank data,
in combination with a structural sequential model of search, are sufficient to recover utility
preference parameters and search cost parameters.
The authors use the fitted model to assess the effects Amazon.com’s product references.
Providing easy access to products by means of product references selectively lowers search
costs for some products, but not all. Doing so may increase consumer surplus if the prod-
uct references facilitate the finding of preferred products at a lower cost, but it may also
lower consumer surplus if search costs are lowered on the wrong products or if lower search
costs result in disproportionately more search. Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010)
find that 99% of simulated consumers benefit from the Amazon.com product references,
driven mostly by a decrease in average search costs while product choice remained mostly
unchanged. In particular, there are popular products that are chosen frequently if searched,
and the Amazon.com product references help consumers find those products at lower cost.
Gibbs Sampler, A Bayesian Approach
Morozov (2019) studies the computer hard drive market, building on the framework of
Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) detailed above. The goal of the study is to
assess the adoption of a recent product introduction, the solid state drive (SSD). To do so,
the author augments the model to include awareness. Each consumer may be aware (or not)
of the existence of SSD hard drives. Lacking awareness of the SSD products, a consumer
would never search and thus never purchase an SSD product.
All empirical applications of the sequential search model discussed thus far have included
two components of utility unobserved to the researcher: random coefficients in utility prefer-
ences (βi) and match value (εij). Morozov (2019) adds a third component, an additional term
of pre-search unobserved preference heterogeneity (ηij) such that his utility specification is
uij = xjβi + ηij + εij (1.11)
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The author then develops a Gibbs sampler using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
simulation methods. This approach removes the optimization step where the likelihood
function is maximized with respect to model parameters and replaces it with an algorithm
that generates draws from the posterior distribution of parameters given the observed search
and purchase decisions of consumers in his data.
The benefit of this Bayesian estimation approach is that it scales easily as the number
of products and dimension of the parameter space grow. In addition, maximum likelihood
approaches require approximations in order to integrate-out consumer heterogeneity, which
is computationally burdensome. And most importantly for search models over large product
assortments, simulating the joint search sequence and purchase outcome is a low probability
event that would require, in a maximum likelihood approach, a large number of simulation
draws to precisely approximate the likelihood. The Bayesian approach succumbs to none of
these. However, as shown in Morozov (2019), the Gibbs sampler converges relatively slowly,
so that proper mixing of the Markov Chain is sometimes achieved only after several thousand
iterations. This autocorrelation among the posterior draws is an issue to be closely assessed
when implementing a Bayesian approach, such as the Gibbs sampling method outlined in
Morozov (2019).
Morozov (2019) uses the estimated model to explain the gap between market shares of
solid state drives and traditional hard disk drives, decomposing the difference into effects of
consumer preferences and those of search frictions. He calculates that increasing the storage
capacity of SSDs to match HDDs increases SDD market share by 14%, decreasing the price
of SSDs to match HDDs increases SDD market share by 13%, and removing search frictions
by decreasing search costs increases SDD market shares by 32%. In contrast, increasing
SDD awareness yields an estimated 84% increase in SDD market share. Thus, he shows
that awareness is an important aspect to include when modeling demand for relatively new
products such as SDDs and that information frictions overwhelm feature, price, and search
considerations, at least for the hard drive market.
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1.3 Extensions to the Sequential Search Model
Although the structural sequential search model can flexibly combine observed and un-
observed preference and search cost heterogeneity for search and purchase behavior over
horizontally and vertically differentiated products, it is still subject to rather stringent as-
sumptions. A set of current research seeks to relax those assumptions and/or augment the
model to accommodate additional important considerations. This section summarizes select
areas of that research.
Gradual Learning through Revisits
Gradual learning is introduced to sequential search models by allowing for the natural
possibility that the consumer is not only uncertain about what price (or match value) firms
offer, but that she is also uncertain about the prevailing offer distribution(s) in the market.6
Thus, by relaxing the rational expectations assumption – that is, by assuming consumers
are not aware of all features, prices, and availability of all products at all times – each
search not only reveals some information about the searched product, but permits the con-
sumer to change her beliefs (usually updated in a Bayesian fashion) about the match-value
distribution.
Chick and Frazier (2012) provides a solution method for dynamically and sequentially
deciding which alternatives to sample and when to stop sampling, when the match-value
distribution is unknown and learned through search. Their result provides an set of rules
analogous to Weitzman’s Selection, Stopping, and Choice Rules.
While I find the result from Chick and Frazier (2012) to most naturally study search
behavior that where consumer revisit previously searched alternatives, Ursu, Wang, and
Chintagunta (2018) cleverly use the result from Chick and Frazier (2012) to study search
6Search with learning problems are related to multi-armed bandit problems, but differ in that the con-
sumer does not receive an award upon each search (lever pull) and when the consumer decides to stop search
(not pull any additional levers) she receives the best of all previously observed rewards.
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duration. In their application, consumers browse an online restaurant review website and
each minute of search is treated as a unique search occasion. The authors find that the
extensive margin of search to mirror previous findings in the search literature, namely that
consumers search few alternatives, but that the intensive margin reveals important informa-
tion. Search duration is considerable in their data, and consumers that search longer have
an increases purchase probability.
In addition, the authors ask whether restaurants should modify the amount of information
provided on their restaurant-specific pages of the website, and whether the platform should
prioritize in its ranking restaurants that have more information on their restaurant-specific
pages. They find that more information on restaurant-specific pages leads to fewer but longer
searches, and greater consumer welfare; the magnitude is substantial with the increase in
transactions equivalent to a 20% reduction in prices in the absence of a change in informa-
tion. If the platform prioritizes restaurants with more information on their restaurant-specific
pages, transactions again increase but now to lower-priced and generally lower-utility restau-
rants, leading to an increase in consumer welfare, but to a much lesser extent than in the
first counterfactual analysis.
Adding Awareness
A mainstay of introductory marketing concepts is the consumer purchase funnel. The
consumer’s path to purchase proceeds through discrete activities of awareness, consideration,
and choice. The sequential search models described thus far capture consideration and choice.
Morozov (2019) augments the model to include awareness.
Specifically, he models the probability pij that consumer i is aware of product j for all
products in the market. The consumer then elects to search over those products of which
she is aware. Morozov (2019) finds that limited adoption of new products (such as the solid-
state drives in the computer hard drive market) is mostly attributed to limited search and
awareness rather than consumer preferences. His result emphasizes the need for marketing
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strategies that aim to inform consumers about new products.
A related model is put forth in Honka, Hortacsu, and Vitorino (2017), where the authors
model an awareness score for each product as a function of market factors and consumer
demographics. They then construct a consumer’s individual likelihood as the product of
her probability of awareness, her probability of consideration conditional on awareness, and
her probability of choice conditional on consideration. The latter two probabilities result
from a simultaneous search model. The focus of their analysis is the effect of advertising.
They find that advertising predominantly affects consumer awareness, but not consideration
and choice. However, as a result of increased awareness, there is a trickle-down effect where
consumers then search more and find better alternatives.
Preference Heterogeneity
Dong et al. (2020) makes use of a unique data set containing a panel of search histories
and purchase occasions for a set of consumers. Using a sequential search model, they inves-
tigate persistence in product choice while accounting for individual-specific preferences. It is
a stylized fact that consumers exhibit strong persistence in their product choices. Prior liter-
ature has interpreted this persistence as evidence that consumers have strong hetergeneous
preferences over existing products. Dong et al. (2020) argues that this must not necessarily
be the case. The authors show that search frictions, coupled with even mild heterogeneous
preferences, can translate into highly persistent choices.
A major result from their work comes from comparing a standard discrete choice model
with consumer-specific preference parameters to an analogous specification that also incor-
porates consumers’ sequential search processes. The authors show that ignoring the search
component results in overstatement of the scope for targeted marketing, an underestimate
of own-price elasticities, and an overestimate of firm’s markups. These results suggest an
important role for consumer search when modeling demand, with implications for marketing,
pricing, and policy decision making. In particular, the authors assess the potential profit
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increases possible from personalized pricing based on each consumer’s purchase and search
history. When purchase history alone is used to set personalized prices, the firm can achieve a
6% increase in profits; an additional 3% increase is possible when consumers’ search histories
are also used.
Price Endogeneity
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) famously addresses price endogeneity in a discrete
choice model of demand that is estimated with only aggregate data. Moraga-Gonzalez,
Sandor, and Wildenbeest (2018) seek to do the same in the context of a sequential search
model. To do so, the authors utilize a recent finding and a careful choice of probability
distribution.
First, Moraga-Gonzalez, Sandor, and Wildenbeest (2018) uses a recent finding by Arm-
strong (2017) and Choi, Dai, and Kim (2018), which consists of a methodology to compute
purchase decisions without taking into account the myriad search paths consumers may pos-
sibly follow. This is important in the setting of Moraga-Gonzalez, Sandor, and Wildenbeest
(2018) where the authors use aggregate data that do not reveal the search sequences taken
by consumers. Specifically, Armstrong (2017) and Choi, Dai, and Kim (2018) show that the
Weitzman’s solution to the sequential search problem is equivalent to picking the firm with
the highest “effective value” wij, where an effective value is the minimum of the reservation
utility and realized utility values:
wij = min {zij, uij} (1.12)
Second, the authors cleverly choose distributional assumptions for the match-value dis-
tribution and the search cost distribution. Specifically, match values are assumed to be IID
T1EV (i.e., independent and identically distributed Type-1 Extreme Value) while search
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costs are distributed according to the CDF
F cij =
1− exp(− exp(−B−1(c)− µij))
1− exp(− exp(−B−1(c))) (1.13)
where B(·) refers to the marginal benefit of search (see Equation (1.1 above) and µij is a
consumer-product specific location parameter of the search cost distribution. Importantly,
the authors show that the search cost CDF is not unlike a normal CDF or T1EV CDF and
thus would not impact results any more than the arbitrary use of those common distributions.
The combined distributional choices for match values and search costs yield a closed-form
probability that consumer i purchases product j conditional on the consumer’s preferences.
As a result, the only integral left in the likelihood function is over consumer-specific prefer-
ences, and the computational complexity of the model is rather mild.
With their computational approach established, the authors estimate their search model
and compare it against a full-information model a` la Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
They find that the full-information model overestimates price sensitivity and leads to an
overestimate of the absolute value of the own-price elasticity.
Future Directions Potentially Guided by Empirical Observations
While potential advancements in the modeling and estimation of search models has been
the focus of this literature review, I close by noting that advances in data collection and
availability have offered tremendous opportunity for contribution to the search literature.
In particular, Bronnenberg, Kim, and Mela (2016) use web browsing log files to observe
URL-level browsing histories and transactions for a panel of consumers over time. Dong
et al. (2020) observe a panel of search sequences for a set of consumers purchasing cosmetic
products online. Seiler and Pinna (2017) use radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags
on shopping carts at a grocery store to observe time spent in front of each product cate-
gory. And subsequent chapters of this dissertation explore consumer search in the U.S. auto
21
industry using smartphone geolocations collected by mobile device applications. As Kim,
Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) note, “the premise [of these data] is that we can learn
about the preference of consumers by studying their shopping behaviors.”
1.4 Search in the U.S. Auto Industry
A few recent studies assess consumer search behavior in the U.S. auto industry.
Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012) estimates a model of supply and demand that
does not specifically incorporate consumer search behavior, but does utilize the locations of
consumers and dealers (and thus the distance between them) to find that consumers have a
strong disutility for travel. The focus of their analysis, however, is on consumer substitution
patterns and dealership pricing in order to assess counterfactual closures of dealerships, a
timely topic following the recession of 2007 when General Motors planned to consolidate its
dealer network, reducing the number of U.S. dealerships by approximately 30%.
Palazzolo and Feinberg (2015) take an approach motivated by simultaneous search. In-
stead of a full structural model, the authors focus on consideration set substitution among
products. They generalize the full-information discrete choice model to incorporate the
probability that an observed consideration set is optimal while flexibly permitting consider-
ation set substitution among available options. Motivated by then-recent Toyota recalls due
to faulty breaking equipment and Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the authors
use their model to study the impact of vehicle redesigns and recalls on consideration and
purchase probabilities.
Murry and Zhou (2019) studies the agglomeration-competition trade-off of dealership co-
location using a sequential search model and transaction-level data for new vehicles sold in the
state of Ohio. The authors assume that consumers search dealership clusters simultaneously,
and like Moraga-Gonzalez, Sandor, and Wildenbeest (2018), observe the locations of the
consumers and dealerships as well as the selling dealership, but do not observe consumer
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search decisions. By comparing results of the search model to a standard model of full
information, the authors find, among other things, that search frictions generate over $300
in mark-ups.
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CHAPTER 2
Data
2.1 Data Sources
I combine data from several sources for my empirical analysis. Mobile device geolocation
data inform me about consumers’ home locations and dealership visits. However, these data
do not provide information on the purchased vehicle. Therefore I combine the dealership
visit data with data on new car registrations from the Texas DMV. By combining these two
data sets, I observe both the search sequence and the purchased vehicle at the individual
level. I supplement these data with consumer and vehicle characteristics, and information
on the location of auto dealerships and the brands they carry.
2.1.1 Search Data
In partnership with a professor at UCLA, I obtained consumer search data from Safegraph,
a company that “provides high-quality location data products” by aggregating location in-
formation from various mobile device applications.1 I was provided with two types of in-
formation for each (anonymized) individual mobile device: estimated home locations and
dealership visits. The estimated home locations were generated by a proprietary model that
is based on the (im)mobility of the device, time of day, and assumed work patterns of device
1See https://github.com/YalePrivacyLab/tracker-profiles/blob/master/trackers/SafeGraph.md and
https://www.safegraph.com/.
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owners. The estimated home locations are stored as a geohash.2 The dealership visits were
generated by Safegraph merging their mobile device geolocation data with their proprietary
data set of U.S. dealership geospacial locations. A unique record is a mobile device at a
dealership (identified by name and street address) at a specific date and time. Thus, for
each mobile device, I observe the visited dealerships and the order of those visits. The data
span the three-month time period from November 1, 2016 to January 31, 2017; I limit the
data to dealership visits in the state of Texas.
The dealership visit data record all dealership visits, for any reason. As a result, they
may capture behavior other than new car searches. To remove errant observations, I exclude
all data for a device if the device is observed (i) at any dealership more than 25 times, (ii)
at the same dealership more than 10 times, or (iii) at any dealership between 12:00am and
6:00am. These criteria are applied to exclude, for example, the device of someone who works
at, delivers vehicles to, or provides janitorial services for an auto dealership. The remaining
data consist of approximately 154,000 unique mobile devices making 277,000 dealership visits
to one or more of the 1,258 dealerships identified by Safegraph.
Dealership visits of consumers shopping for a new car can spread over days or weeks.
This raises the concern that vehicles purchased at the beginning of the three-month time
period may have truncated search sequences. To investigate this concern, I calculate the
average number of days between the first and last search for consumers whose last search
occurred in November 2016 versus during December 2016 and January 2017. I find these
values to be 1.1 and 10.2 days, respectively.3 These numbers suggest that many search
histories for consumers who made a purchase in November 2016 are truncated. As a result,
I limit my analysis to only those consumers who purchased their vehicles in the latter two
2A geohash is a public domain geocoding system that encodes geographic areas into short alphanumeric
strings.
3If I exclude consumers who only made one search, the mean and median number of days between the
first and last search for consumers whose last search occurred during first month are 9.2 and 7, while the
mean and median number of days between the first and last search for consumers whose last search occurred
during the latter two months are 29.3 and 25.
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months (“sample period”). This reduces the sample size to approximately 128,000 consumers
making 243,000 dealership visits.
The sequence of data preparation steps is summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Filters Applied to Search Data
Filter Devices Remaining Pings Remaining
Visits to Dealerships in Texas 157,582 313,806
Remove any Device at any Dealership > 25 157,173 296,889
Remove any Device at Same Dealership > 10 156,439 285,054
Remove any Device at Any Dealership at Night 153,848 277,083
Remove any Device with last Visit < Dec 2016 127,595 243,426
2.1.2 Purchase Data
My second data come from the Texas DMV. I observe all first-time titled or registered vehicles
in the state of Texas for the 16-month period spanning June 2016 through September 2017.
The data include the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), the registrant, the registrant’s
address, the date that the title or registration paperwork was processed by the state of Texas,
the gross sales price before any adjustment for a trade-in vehicle, the VIN for the trade-in
vehicle if applicable, and the name, city, and state of the previous owner. It is important to
note that information on the previous owner identifies the dealership from which a vehicle
was purchased (“selling dealership”). While most of this information is available to the
public through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the personally identifying
information is not. It must be obtained through a special request and its use is subject to
restrictions.
To focus on new retail vehicle sales for which consumer search data may be available
from Safegraph, I limit the Texas DMV data to vehicles that belong to the 35 most popular
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brands from model years 2015–2018 with an odometer reading of fewer than 2,000 miles, a
price exceeding $5,000, and for which the date of title occurred during the sample period (or
less than 14 days after its end).4 These criteria are used to omit used vehicles, commercial
vehicles such as freight trucks, and alternative vehicles such as motorcycles, motor homes,
and tractors. In addition, I constrain the Texas DMV data to only vehicles for which the
registrant has a non-PO Box home address in the state of Texas; this is a necessary criterion
for combining the search and purchase data. Finally, data are excluded if more than one
vehicle is titled to the same individual during the sample period or if the registrant is not
an individual. Approximately 195,000 vehicles meet these criteria.
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b each provide a map of individuals’ home locations. Figure 2.1a
displays home locations for searchers from the Safegraph data, while Figure 2.1b displays
home locations of buyers from the Texas DMV data. Although the data sources are different,
the figures show a similar geographic distribution of consumers across the state and major
urban areas are clearly identifiable.
2.1.3 Dealership Data
I manually prepared a third data set consisting of all auto dealerships in the state of Texas
and the brands carried at each dealership. This data collection was necessary for two rea-
sons. First, the colloquial and legal definition of a dealership vary and I required a definition
compatible with the Safegraph data. I use the term and have organized the data such that
a “dealership” represents a distinct geographic area of new vehicle retailing. For example,
although Randall Noe Chrysler Dodge and Randall Noe Subaru are legally distinct deal-
erships, their showrooms share the same building, they have the same street address, and
the vehicles in inventory are adjacently located on the same lot. I therefore categorize them
4In a conversation with a Texas DMV employee, her experience was that title and registration paperwork
is typically processed between one and fourteen days after submission to the DMV or county tax office, and
that submission typically occurs immediately upon sale of a vehicle by a dealership.
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as one dealership. By contrast, Blue Bonnet Motors, located at the intersection of North
Interstate 35 Frontage Road and McQueeney Road in New Braunfels, Texas (a suburb of
San Antonio), appears to be a single distinct legal entity, but with separate showrooms
and street addresses for the Ford, Lincoln, and Jeep brands. I therefore categorize them
as separate dealerships. Second, to make reasonable assumptions about vehicles that were
searched but not purchased, as required for the structural search model to be introduced
later, I require information on the set of brands carried at each dealership. For example,
often the General Motors brands Chevrolet, Buick, GMC, and Cadillac are often available
at the same dealership.
I identify 1,314 auto dealerships that carry new vehicles in the state of Texas. This
number of dealerships is very similar to the number of dealerships (1,309) listed by the Texas
Automotive Dealership Association (TADA) as of February 2018.5 The small difference in
the number of dealerships is due to (i) dealerships that operated during the sample period
but closed by the 2018 TADA count and (ii) TADA and I differing in how to treat two
adjacent and related retail locations (TADA may recognize them as two dealerships while I
count them as one or vice versa). Figure 2.2 plots the locations of all 1,314 auto dealerships
across the state of Texas. As expected, dealership locations are highly correlated with the
geographic distribution of the population as shown above in Figure 2.1.
Consistently identifying dealerships across data sets is essential for combining the search
and purchase data. The manually compiled data on dealerships are matched (i) to the
dealership street addresses in the Safegraph search data and (ii) to the previous owner names
in the DMV registrations data. An overlapping subset of 1,197 dealerships are identified from
both data sets. Not all dealerships could be merged either because the previous owner names
in the Texas DMV data were not sufficiently descriptive to uniquely identify a dealership in
the Safegraph data or because the Safegraph data did not contain visits to that dealership.
5https://www.tada.org/web/Online/About TADA/Dealer Search.aspx
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Figure 2.2: Texas Dealership Locations
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This latter case could occur if Safegraph did not have a geofence for that dealership or
if no mobile device in the Safegraph data was observed to visit the dealership during the
three-month sample period.
2.1.4 Vehicle Characteristics Data
VinAudit.com, Inc., a leading vehicle data and software solutions provider for the U.S. auto-
motive market, provided data on vehicle characteristics. I obtained the data by “decoding”
the registered and trade-in VINs using the company’s API. Collected vehicle characteristics
include model year, make, model, trim, “base” MSRP, vehicle type (car, SUV, truck, van),
body type (e.g., sedan), number of doors, drive type (e.g., front-wheel drive), engine size,
and transmission type.6 I supplement these data with information on vehicle horsepower
collected from Google.
I also collected data on vehicle “types” and rankings within each type from Edmunds.com.
Edmunds classifies all vehicle models into one of 40 types. For example, the Honda Fit is
categorized as an Extra-Small Hatchback, while the Toyota Highlander is categorized as a
Midsize 3-Row SUV. Within a type, Edmunds ranks each vehicle. Their ranking process is
proprietary and opaque.7 The Edmunds data are used to make assumptions about (similar)
searched or potentially searched, but not purchased vehicles when modeling consumer choices
and behavior (see Section 2.2.3).
6The APIs used to gather car characteristics provided “base” MSRP. The definition of “base” is
manufacturer-specific and may be at either the model-level or trim-level. These base prices do not in-
clude features that customize the vehicles beyond the set of included features in the most basic configuration
of the manufacturer’s model or trim. For example, if a sunroof is included as part of a specific 2017 Ford
Fiesta SE but the sunroof is not a standard feature on all 2017 Ford Fiesta SEs, then the added cost of the
sunroof is not included in the collected MSRP. This means that, for example, two vehicles that are largely
similar (i.e., same model or same trim) but have different optional features will show the same MSRP.
7Edmunds describes its ranking process as: “Each vehicle is driven on a standardized road test loop and
visits our test track for instrumented testing in controlled conditions. Our time behind the wheel is used
to develop ratings that describe how a car stacks up against its direct rivals in a particular size and price
class.” (https://www.edmunds.com/new-car-ratings/).
31
2.1.5 Consumer Characteristics Data
I collected consumer demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 Census and
American Community Survey. The data include information at the Census Blockgroup level
on age, race, gender, educational attainment, income, employment status, and number of
children.
2.2 Data Cleaning and Construction of Analysis Data Set
To empirically estimate a search model, I must (i) combine the search and purchase data,
(ii) define the searchable set of dealerships, (iii) define the searchable set of vehicles, and (iv)
create the final sample for the empirical analysis. I provide a detailed decription of these
four steps below. Note that I limit the analysis sample to the five brands with the largest
market shares in Texas during the sample period. This set of brands has a combined market
share of 60%.
2.2.1 Combining Search and Purchase Data
There is no unique identifier in the Safegraph dealership visit data that corresponds to infor-
mation in the Texas DMV registrations data to indicate which search sequence corresponds
to which purchased vehicle. Therefore, to merge these two data sets, I employ the following
algorithm: first, the algorithm finds a search sequence that includes a visit to the selling
dealership prior to the vehicle registration date, and second, the algorithm requires that the
home location of the searcher and of the buyer are approximately the same. In the following,
I provide more details on the employed algorithm.
First, recall that the home location of a mobile device user in the search data is an esti-
mated geohash while the purchase data from the Texas DMV provides the registrant’s street
address. I geocode both sets of location information as latitude and longitude coordinates.
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For the search data, I use the center of the geohash; for the purchase data, I use coordinates
from the GoogleMaps API, which is reputed to often report the centroid of the building at
the specified address, but in some cases may report a streetfront location (i.e., effectively
where a mailbox would be placed).
I then require that the two home locations are in close proximity. To do so, I calculate
the distance between each of the 154,000 mobile device home locations in the dealership
visits data and each of the 264,000 unique registrant’s home addresses in the purchase data
using the Haversine great-circle distance measure, which is the shortest distance between
two points on a sphere. Due to computer memory constraints, for each mobile device home
location, I retain up to a maximum of 50 “potential merges” (i.e., pairs of searcher and buyer
vectors of information) where the distance between the home locations is one-fifth of a mile
or closer. In short, I find up to 50 vehicle sales that could potentially be the result of each
observed search sequence.
Next, I evaluate these potential merges in increasing order of distance. For each potential
merge, I assess whether the mobile device had visited the selling dealership and whether that
visit occurred on or before the vehicle registration date. If so, I merge that search sequence
with that purchased vehicle, and I discard all other potential merges involving that search
sequence or vehicle. If, instead, the potential merge involved home locations that were close
in proximity but where the mobile device had not visited the selling dealership on or before
the registration date, I discard that potential merge.8 I then evaluate the next (in terms
of shortest distance) potential merge. The process proceeds until all potential merges are
evaluated and either accepted or discarded.
With this algorithm, I find the purchased vehicle for 12,065 search sequences. This repre-
8This procedure minimizes the probability that I incorrectly merge a search sequence and a purchased
vehicle simply due to the proximity of home locations in the search and purchase data sets. For example,
if two vehicles were purchased during the sample period by residents of the same apartment building and
both have search sequences captured by Safegraph’s dealership visits data, I am able to correctly merge the
search sequences to the purchased vehicles unless both consumers visited both selling dealerships, which is
rather unlikely given the relatively short search sequences observed by most consumers.
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sents 9.5% of the mobile devices in the Safegraph data and 6.2% of the vehicle registrations
in the Texas DMV data. These figures appear reasonable for the following reasons. First, the
search data also include dealership visits for consumers who were shopping for used vehicles
or who were taking a currently-owned vehicle to a dealership’s service department for main-
tenance – both activities are likely to occur with greater frequency than new car shopping.
Second, the search data also include dealership visits by consumers who searched, but did
not purchase a new vehicle. And third, the search data purportedly represent 5%–10% of
U.S. mobile devices during the sample period and thus it is expected that these data capture
approximately the same percentage of new car purchases.
Figure 2.3 provides maps of the four metropolitan areas onto which dealership locations
and consumer home locations are overlaid; the set of consumer home locations plotted in-
cludes only those for whom I could identify both the search sequence and registered vehicle
following the algorithm outlined above. It shows that dealerships often occur spatially clus-
tered and are generally located along major roadways. And, as expected, consumers are
often clustered into residential areas (e.g., the southwest and suburban areas of Houston)
and are sparse in industrial areas (e.g., the northeast area of Houston where the George
Bush Intercontinental Airport is located).
2.2.2 The Searchable Set of Dealerships
In much the same way that a multinomial discrete choice model requires information on the
chosen product as well as the products not chosen, my structural search model requires infor-
mation on the set of (potentially) searchable products, regardless of whether the consumer
searched them or not.9 Across the 35 brands, there are more than 1,100 dealerships in the
state of Texas. To ease the computational burden imposed by such a large set of searchable
9As explained in Section 2.2.3, a “product” here is a vehicle at a dealership. I will assume a consumer
searches her most-preferred vehicle at each dealership and thus it is equivalent to reference the searchable
set of dealerships or searchable set of vehicles.
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Figure 2.3: Dealership and Consumer Locations in Select Cities
(a) Austin (b) Dallas
(c) Houston (d) San Antonio
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products, I take two steps.
First, I limit the analysis to the five brands with the largest market shares in Texas during
the sample period, which are Chevrolet, Ford, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. This set of brands
has a combined market share of 60%. Focusing the analysis on these brands requires that
I also limit the data to consumers who purchased these brands and whose search histories
only include visits to dealerships that carry these brands. This reduces the sample size to
7,051 consumers.
Second, I limit the searchable set of dealerships to any dealership within a particular
radius of the consumer. To define the radius for each consumer, I first partition consumers
into urban and rural consumers. Urban consumers are those who live within the city limits
of any major city (where major is defined as a city with a population exceeding 100,000
inhabitants) and rural consumers live outside of these major cities. For urban consumers
in each major city and for rural consumers in each county (excluding inhabitants of the
major cities in that county), I assign a radius as twice the 70th percentile of the distance
between the home location of a car buyer and the selling dealership, where I calculate distance
distributions from the original 16-month DMV data set containing 195,000 new vehicle DMV
registrations.
For example, suppose a consumer lives in the rural part of Dallas County and my data
contain 10,000 new vehicle registrations with the Texas DMV from rural residents of Dallas
County. I calculate the 70th percentile of the distance between those 10,000 residents’ home
and the selling dealerships. Suppose this value is 30 miles. Then for each consumer in the
analysis sample who lives in the rural part of Dallas County, I assign a radius of 60 miles.
Therefore, the searchable set of dealerships for rural Dallas County residents includes any
dealership within 60 miles of the consumer’s home location. Note that this set of dealerships
may differ across rural residents of Dallas County if some dealerships are within 60 miles of
some consumers’ homes, but others are not.
Across the state, the average radii for urban and rural consumers are 29.6 and 33.5 miles,
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respectively. I find that 7.6% of consumers search or purchase a vehicle from a dealership
outside of their assigned radius and exclude these consumers from the analysis sample. This
step reduces the sample size to 6,511 consumers making 7,175 dealership visits.
2.2.3 The Searchable Set of Vehicles
Through the process of merging the search and purchase data, I know which vehicle each
individual consumer purchased at which selling dealership. However, for all dealerships she
visited but did not make a purchase, I do not observe which vehicle she searched. Further,
for all dealerships the consumer decided not to visit, I do not observe which vehicle she
would have searched if she had decided otherwise. To estimate the structural search model,
I need both pieces of information. I make the following set of assumptions about searched
and potentially searchable vehicles.
For each consumer and each searchable dealership identified by the process outlined in
the previous section, I assume that there is one most-preferred vehicle that could be searched,
i.e., if the consumer were to visit a particular dealership, she would have searched only her
most preferred vehicle at that dealership. It is important to note that the most-preferred
vehicle at a particular dealership is consumer-specific: if the same dealership is searchable by
multiple consumers, each consumer has her own most-preferred vehicle at that dealership.
To identify this consumer-specific, most-preferred vehicle at each dealership, I impose two
criteria: (1) the potentially searched vehicle must be in that dealership’s inventory and (2)
it must be of the same Edmunds type as the vehicle ultimately purchased by the consumer.
For the first criterion, “inventory” is defined as any model sold by that dealership during
the 16 months for which the Texas DMV registration data are available.10 This criteria en-
forces that consumers can only search for a model at a particular dealership if that dealership
has recently carried and sold that model.
10A model is a particular combination of model year, make, and model. For example, one model is a 2017
Toyota Corolla.
37
In addition to being in inventory, the second criterion requires that a searched vehicle
must be of the same Edmunds type as the vehicle ultimately purchased by the consumer. This
assumption is equivalent to assuming that consumers search for a specific vehicle conditional
on having decided the type of vehicle they would like to buy. This assumption is consistent
with prior literature and industry reports of consumer search behavior. For example, Honka
(2014) and Honka and Chintagunta (2017) also do not observe searched-but-not-purchased
alternatives and make the assumption that the most-similar product offered by other sellers
is the product searched. Moreover, industry reports indicate that the new car purchase
process usually starts with online search, which is broader and where consumers may consider
different types of cars. But as consumers move to offline search (e.g., visiting dealerships),
they usually have a specific car in mind.11 This view is reflected in prior academic literature
on modeling vehicle choice. For example, Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012) estimate a
nested logit model and choose the first level of nests defined by car type and the second level
of nests composed of alternatives of the same type (but different brands).
To continue the earlier example in order to demonstrate this process: suppose the rural
Dallas County consumer is observed to purchase a 2017 Nissan Versa Note and that her
searchable set of dealerships includes XYZ Chevrolet. According to Edmunds, two Chevrolet
vehicles are of the same type as the Nissan Versa Note (type: “Extra-Small Hatchback”).
Those two vehicles are the Chevrolet Spark and the Chevrolet Sonic. Suppose that the Texas
DMV registrations data show that the XYZ Chevrolet dealership sold zero 2017 Chevrolet
Sparks and nineteen 2017 Chevrolet Sonics during the 16 months for which I have Texas
DMV registration data. Then the searchable vehicle for my example consumer at XYZ
11See, for example:
https://v12data.com/blog/automotive-marketing-overview-current-marketing-trends-statistics-and-strategies/;
https://www.acaresearch.com.au/australian-market-research-blog/the-automotive-vehicle-purchase-journey-in-2015;
https://www.edmunds.com/car-buying/10-steps-to-finding-the-right-car-for-you.html;
https://santanderconsumerusa.com/learning-center/i-need-another-car-now-what;
https://growwithcars.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2014.05-Consumer-Journey-Report Final.pdf.
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Chevrolet is assumed to be the 2017 Chevrolet Sonic because (i) it has the same model year
and the same Edmunds type as the purchased vehicle and because (ii) it was in inventory at
the searched dealership.12
In total, my analysis sample contains 175,840 potentially searched vehicles across the
6,511 consumers. The number of potentially searchable vehicles is plotted in Figure 2.4,
which range from 1 to 177, with a mean of 27 and a median of 24 vehicles.
Figure 2.4: Searchable Set Sizes
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Finally, I must also infer the set of vehicle characteristics for each searchable vehicle. To
do so, I compute the median values (for numeric characteristics) and modal values (for cat-
egorical characteristics) by model and dealership. Thus if the rural Dallas County consumer
could search a 2017 Chevrolet Sonic at two different Chevrolet dealers (say ABC Chevrolet
12In the event that multiple vehicles meet these criteria, the vehicle that is ranked highest according to
Edmunds.com is selected as the most-preferred vehicle. This occurs in the analysis dataset for less than 1%
of searchable vehicles and occurs only once for one consumer at a dealership that she chose to search.
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and XYZ Chevrolet), the city mileage of the 2017 Sonic at ABC Chevrolet depends on the
city mileage of the other 2017 Sonics sold by ABC Chevrolet and differs from the city mileage
calculated for the 2017 Sonic at XYZ Chevrolet. This approach is consistent with that taken
by Moreno and Terwiesch (2017).13
2.2.4 A Detailed Example
To summarize the information available following the aforementioned assumptions made dur-
ing the data cleaning and construction of the analysis dataset, I provide a detailed look at one
consumer. This consumer is identified with a unique, anonymized Safegraph identification
code ending in “2c76”. This consumer is observed to have visited 3 dealerships during the
sample period: First Texas Honda at 11:32am on 1/20/17, Round Rock Toyota at 2:34pm
on 1/20/17, and Round Rock Honda at 3:38pm on 1/24/17. This consumers’ home location
is the closest remaining home location (during the merging algorithm) to the registration
address for a Honda Odyssey EX-L sold by Round Rock Honda (VIN ending in “4939”) with
paperwork processed by the Texas DMV on 2/6/17. Because the consumer visited the selling
dealership prior to the date the DMV processed the registration paperwork and because the
consumer’s home location is the closest remaining homelocation (and not greater than 0.2
miles from the registrant’s address) during the merging algorithm, I identify this vehicle as
the one purchased by this consumer. For the rest of this example, I will arbitrarily choose
refer to the consumer as Mary for simplicity.
Mary lives in Round Rock, Texas (William County), a city of more than 100,000 inhab-
itants and thus Mary is classified as an urban consumer. Out of the approximately 195,000
13Note that I use median and modal values for the purchased vehicle as well as for each potentially
searchable, as consistency is required in order to model the consumer’s choice between vehicles. Also note
that it would be possible to obtain the exact characteristics of each vehicle sold during my sample period
by obtaining and codifying the information on the Monroney Label (also known as the “window sticker”).
However, while some private services exist to view a single Monroney Label, I have not found any services
that provide the information for all brands in the market, that offer an API, or that price reasonably to
facility large-scale statistical analyses. Given that I would require such data for every potentially searched
vehicle during my sample period, the time and monetary costs exceed what is feasible.
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new vehicle registrations of passenger cars and light duty trucks in the Texas DMV data
made available to me, 3,012 were registered to an address in William County and, of those,
858 were registered to an address in Round Rock, Texas. The 70th percentile of the dis-
tances between these 858 registrant addresses and the selling dealerships is 14.38 miles. Thus
I assume that Mary could search any dealership within 28.76 miles of her home (twice the
70th percentile distance). There are 18 dealerships across the five focal brands within 28.76
miles of Mary’s home. However, Mary purchased a Honda Odyssey EX-L, a vehicle in the
Edmunds “minivan” class. Chevrolet and Ford do not offer a vehicle in this class, and thus
I assume Mary will not search any Chevrolet or Ford dealerships. There are 7 remaining
dealerships for which I identify a most-preferred vehicle for Mary (3 Honda dealerships, 2
Nissan, and 2 Toyota) and which she could potentially search. According to the Edmunds
classification system, the other minivan vehicles include the Toyota Sienna and Nissan Quest,
both of which were found to have been sold by the nearby dealerships and thus assumed to
be in inventory and potentially searchable by Mary. I then compute the distance to each
of these dealerships from Mary’s approximate home location and the median/modal vehicle
values as the vehicle characteristics for the potentially searchable Honda Odysseys, Toyota
Siennas, and Nissan Quests. Note that the characteristics computed may differ by dealer-
ship, even for the same make and model. Figure 2.5 plots Mary’s approximate home location
in black as well as the Honda (red), Toyota (blue), and Nissan (green) dealership locations,
and the radius of 28.76 miles around Mary’s home.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
The final analysis sample contains 6, 511 consumers who make 7, 175 visits to one of 544
unique dealerships. 91.1% of consumers search once, 7.8% of consumers search twice, and
1.1% of consumers search three or more times. Figure 2.6 shows a histogram of the number
of searches. The average number of searches per consumer is 1.1. This average number of
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Figure 2.5: Example Consumer’s Home Location and
Nearby Searchable Dealerships
l
searches in my data is consistent with the trend of search behavior reported in academic
literature (see Table 2.2) and with the most recent reports, albeit slightly smaller. For
example, during an FTC Workshop on auto distribution in the U.S., Peter Welch, President
of the National Automotive Dealers Association (NADA), reported that “the average number
of dealerships that a consumer visits before they make a purchase, an actual purchase, has
gone down from 4.1 dealerships in 2005 to today, it’s 1.3.14 Much of this decline is driven by
14https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public events/895193/auto distribution transcript.pdf.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Number of Searches
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online search (i.e., online browsing or online research), which is how the new car shopping
process commonly starts.15
The distance a consumer must travel to visit a dealership is my key variable. Consumers
live in close proximity to many dealerships. On average, consumers in the analysis sample
live within 10 miles of 6 dealerships. As I extend the radius to 20 and 30 miles, that number
increases 16 and 24 dealerships, respectively. The observation that consumers live in close
proximity to many dealerships, but only search a limited number of them suggests that it is
important to take their search behavior into consideration when modeling demand.
Not only are many dealerships located near consumers, but consumers also tend to pur-
chase from nearby dealerships. The median distance from a consumer’s home to the selling
15See, e.g., Ratchford, Talukdar, and Lee (2007) or https://geomarketing.com/86-percent-of-car-shoppers-
do-research-online-before-visiting-a-dealership.
43
Table 2.2: Consumer Search Behavior in the U.S. Auto Industry
Reported in Academic Literature
Study Findings
Kiel and Layton (1981) 35% of carbuyers made 2 or fewer visits, 20% made 6+
Ratchford and Srinivasan (1993) 4.6 dealer visits on average
Lapersonne, Laurent, and Le Goff (1995) 22% only considered one brand
Klein and Ford (2003) 39% visited 2 or fewer dealers
Ratchford, Lee, and Talukdar (2003) “seriously considered” 2.5 dealers on average
Zettelmeyer, Morton, and Silva-Risso (2006) online buyer collected info for 2–3 cars; offline buyer 1 car
Ratchford, Talukdar, and Lee (2007) 2.19–2.53 median dealer visits between 1990–2002
Kim and Ratchford (2012) 1.7 median number of manufacturers considered
Singh, Ratchford, and Prasad (2014) 3.24 dealers visited on average
Jang, Prasad, and Ratchford (2017) 0.7–1.43 dealers visited on average between 2002–2012
Palazzolo and Feinberg (2015) 45.8% considered 1 vehicle, while 32.5%, 15.2%, and 6.5% con-
sidered 2, 3, and 4+ vehicles
Murry and Zhou (2019) estimate 46.7% search 1 dealer cluster, 34.4% 2 clusters, 18.7%
3 clusters, 0.2% 4+ clusters
Moraga-Gonzalez, Sandor, and Wildenbeest (2018) histogram: (1 dealer visit) 47%, (2) 20%, (3) 16%, (4) 7%, (5)
3%, (6) 3%, (7) 1%, and (8+) 2%
dealership is 5.2 miles. Figure 2.7a shows the distance distribution from home to the selling
dealership: most consumers purchase from dealerships within 30 miles of their home.16 As
a point of comparison, in Figure 2.7b, I display the distribution of percentiles for the dis-
tance to the selling dealership in each consumer’s set of searchable dealerships. For example,
suppose a consumer bought from the closest dealership and had five searchable dealerships.
Then the consumer purchased from a dealership in the 0.2 percentile. The distribution in
Figure 2.7b shows that consumers tend to purchase from dealerships below the 0.5 percentile.
The few consumers who purchase from a high percentile dealership are mostly consumers
with small sets of searchable dealerships (fewer than five dealerships).
Consumers can purchase a vehicle from the closest dealership carrying the purchased
16Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012) find the mean and median distance between consumers’ homes
and selling dealerships to be 10 and 7.3 miles, respectively, based on zip code centroids. These distances
are also consistent with not observed, but estimated distance distributions reported by prior literature (e.g.,
Nurski and Verboven 2016, Moraga-Gonzalez, Sandor, and Wildenbeest 2018, Murry and Zhou 2019).
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Figure 2.7: Consumers’ Distances to Dealerships
(a) In Miles
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Figure 2.8: Miles Beyond Closest Same-Brand Dealership to Selling Dealership
Miles
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brand or they can purchase from a more distant dealership carrying the same brand. 72% of
consumers in the analysis sample buy from the closest dealer offering the purchased brand,
the remaining 28% do not. Figure 2.8 shows the distance (beyond the closest dealership) to
the selling dealership for those consumers who did not purchase from the closest dealership
offering the ultimately purchased brand. The mean and median “extra” traveled distance
are 7.6 and 5.7 miles, respectively. Buying from a more distant dealership suggests that
that dealership offers an observed (to the consumer) prior-to-search benefit that exceeds the
additional time, travel, and mental costs incurred from making the longer trip.
And lastly, descriptive statistics on dealerships and purchased vehicles are displayed in
Table 2.3. Chevrolet and Ford have many more dealerships than Honda, Nissan, or Toyota.17
17As documented in Murry and Schneider (2016), dealership entry and location result from a complex
combination of timing, firm strategy, and the political economy of the U.S. auto market. To briefly summa-
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The average vehicle characteristics reported in Table 2.3 are influenced by pickup truck sales.
Chevrolet and Ford sell a higher percentage of trucks in the Texas market than the other
brands and, as a result, tend to have higher average horsepower and engine sizes, while
offering lower gas mileage.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Values of Purchased Vehicles
Purchases Dealerships MSRP Horsepower Engine Size City MPG
Chevrolet 1,222 212 $34,912 241 3.95 19.9
Ford 1,860 213 $36,670 259 3.31 18.7
Honda 981 56 $26,879 192 2.32 26.9
Nissan 652 64 $29,944 208 2.97 23.8
Toyota 1,796 79 $31,277 212 3.19 22.5
Note: The number of purchases are those in my final analysis sample. MSRP abbreviates man-
ufacturer’s suggested retail price; MPG abbreviates miles per gallon.
2.4 Reduced-Form Evidence
In this section, I investigate the set of variables that predict consumer purchase and show
that including distance to dealerships is important when modeling demand for cars. I do
so by estimating three standard multinomial logit models. Because consumers are assumed
rize, the number of new-car dealerships in the U.S. peaked in 1927 at over 50,000 dealerships (today there
are approximately 20,000). These were almost entirely small dealerships selling domestic-branded vehicles
(Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler) and they blanketed virtually all urban and rural corners of the coun-
try. In the decades that followed, U.S. auto manufacturers became an oligopoly and dealerships responded
by growing in size (usually through merging or acquiring nearly dealerships) and through legal protection.
Shortly thereafter in the 1950s, the U.S. relaxed import barriers on automobiles and foreign-branded deal-
erships entered the U.S. market. The relatively-late entry of foreign-branded dealerships and territorial
protections imposed by dealership franchise laws led to distinct patterns of dealership sizes and locations.
As reported in Lafontaine and Scott Morton (2010), there are many more domestic-branded dealerships
than foreign-branded dealership in metropolitan areas (in part a legacy of residential organization prior to
suburbanization), and domestic-branded dealerships have many rural locations, whereas foreign brands have
few.
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to choose a vehicle from a set of vehicles that are of the same Edmund’s vehicle type, it is
not necessary (or possible) to include vehicle characteristics such as the number of doors or
engine type (gas vs electric) as these characteristics do not vary across vehicles within an
Edmund’s type. Instead, I focus on three major characteristics likely to impact consumer
decision-making conditional on type: horsepower, engine size (i.e., displacement measured
in liters), and estimated city mileage (MPG). In addition, because my data are from Texas,
I include interactions with a dummy variable (“large vehicle”) to indicate if the vehicle is a
truck or a large SUV (most of which are built on a truck chassis). And lastly, I use MSRP
as a measure of price.18
In Table 2.4, I show coefficient estimates and implied price elasticities for two full in-
formation models (a) and (b), in which the consumer is assumed to have knowledge of all
searchable alternatives, and a limited information model (c), in which the consumer only
chooses among the products she has searched. The two full information models differ in the
included covariates with model (b) additionally including the distance to each dealership.
Across all three multinomial logit models, the coefficient estimates are similar in terms of
signs and magnitudes. Coefficient significance is also generally consistent with the exception
of MPG in the limited information model (c). Price negatively affects utility, as expected. On
average, consumers prefer Toyota and Honda to Nissan, Ford, and Chevrolet for small and
medium-sized vehicles. For large vehicles including pickup trucks, consumers prefer Ford.
Among the vehicle attributes, engine size and city mileage have the expected positive sign.
Horsepower is estimated to have a negative effect on utility. A potential explanation is that,
conditional on vehicle type, engine size, and city mileage, vehicles configured to provide
extra horsepower may require additional maintenance and are therefore not preferred by
consumers.
Recall that model (b) additionally includes distances to dealerships as a covariate. The
18While the data include the actual price paid for each purchased vehicle, MSRP is observed for both
purchased and not-purchased vehicles. It also better reflects consumers’ knowledge of prices prior to search.
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Table 2.4: Multinomial Logit Models
Model (a) Model (b) Model (c)
Full Information Full Information Limited Information
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
MSRP (in $10,000) −0.388∗∗ 0.034 −0.415∗∗ 0.037 −0.441∗∗ 0.169
Chevrolet −1.786∗∗ 0.069 −1.662∗∗ 0.071 −2.658∗∗ 0.450
Ford −1.283∗∗ 0.073 −1.104∗∗ 0.075 −2.190∗∗ 0.446
Nissan −0.143 0.073 −0.118 0.076 −0.027 0.378
Toyota 0.069 0.055 0.188∗∗ 0.056 −0.332 0.285
Large Vehicle x Chevrolet 1.349∗∗ 0.115 1.375∗∗ 0.119 2.017∗∗ 0.601
Large Vehicle x Ford 1.824∗∗ 0.110 1.922∗∗ 0.114 2.478∗∗ 0.611
Large Vehicle x Toyota −0.010 0.098 −0.064 0.101 −0.538 0.494
Horsepower (in 100) −1.013∗∗ 0.059 −1.050∗∗ 0.061 −0.989∗∗ 0.303
Engine Size 0.284∗∗ 0.034 0.324∗∗ 0.036 0.388∗∗ 0.186
MPG 0.085∗∗ 0.010 0.095∗∗ 0.011 0.027 0.053
MPG x Large Vehicle 0.016∗∗ 0.006 0.015∗∗ 0.006 0.034 0.031
Distance (in Miles) −0.219∗∗ 0.003
Number of Consumers 6, 511 6, 511 6, 511
Number of Products 175, 840 175, 840 7, 175
Log-Likelihood −18, 157 −13, 071 −381
BIC 36, 455 26, 247 867
Own-Price Elasticities
Chevrolet −1.18 −1.26 −0.88
Ford −1.21 −1.30 −0.92
Honda −1.00 −1.08 −0.54
Nissan −1.40 −1.50 −0.68
Toyota −1.20 −1.29 −0.81
Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. The base brand is Honda.
BIC = log(N)×k−2×LL where N = 6, 511 is the number of consumers and k is the estimated number of
parameters. Own-price elasticities calculated as b = (
∑N
i=1 J
b
i )
−1∑N
i=1
∑Jbi
j=1 βMSRP×MSRPij×(1−pij)
where i indexes consumers, j indicates the vehicles of brand b with consideration set size Jbi for con-
sumer i, and pij is the probability consumer i purchases vehicle j.
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distance coefficient is (as expected) negative, large (in absolute terms), and precisely esti-
mated. Moreover, its addition provides substantial improvements in the log-likelihood and
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicating that distance adds to the explanatory power
of the model. In addition, price elasticities are more elastic when distance is included.
Comparing models (a) and (b) to model (c), price elasticities are smaller than one (in
absolute terms) in the limited information model. The price elasticities are inelastic because
of the large number of consideration sets of size one: consumers with such a consideration
set would not select a different alternative even if prices increase because they only have one
alternative available to them. This is a particular limitation of limited-information discrete
choice models, one that can be addressed through a structural search model as described
next.
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CHAPTER 3
Model and Estimates
3.1 Utility and Search
I model consumer search and purchase decisions using a sequential search model for match
value. A product is defined as a combination of a specific vehicle and a dealership (e.g., a
Honda Civic at the John Eagle Honda Dealership of Dallas). The match value captures a
mix of hard-to-quantify product characteristics that provide a unique, idiosynchratic match
(or mismatch) with the consumer. The consumer learns about the match value by visiting
a dealership. The match value might, for example, include how much a consumer likes the
layout of the dashboard, how well a consumer can see in the car, how much a consumer
enjoys driving the car, how courteous and helpful the dealership staff is, etc. Given that I
use MSRP as the measure of price in the utility function (prior and post search), the match
value also includes any deviation from MSRP due to, e.g., bargaining or a trade-in vehicle.
Consumer i = 1, . . . , N derives utility from product j = 1, . . . , Ji with (indirect) utility
uij given by
uij = δij + εij (3.1)
with
δij = xjβ + ηij,
ηij ∼ N(0, 1), and
εij ∼ N (0, σ) .
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This framework partitions what the consumer knows and does not know prior to searching.
Prior to search, δij is known by the consumer. It is composed of a vector of observable vehicle
characteristics xj, a vector of consumer preferences for those characteristics β, and consumer
i’s product-specific idiosyncratic preferences ηij, which are unobserved by the researcher but
known by the consumer prior to search. The second component of utility, εij, is the product
fit or match value. The consumer knows the distributions of match values, N (0, σ), but she
is uncertain about her specific match value with each product εij and must search to discover
it.
Search is performed sequentially and at a cost. Searching a product completely reveals
the consumer’s match value with that product, but does not reveal information about any
other product. The cost of searching a product is parameterized as cij = exp{d′ijγ} to ensure
search costs are positive. d is a vector of an intercept, the distance between the consumer’s
home location and the dealership of the searched product, an urban/rural indicator for the
geographic location of the consumer, and an interaction between the latter two variables. γ
is a parameter vector for the cost covariates. Consumers are assumed to have perfect recall
and there is no cost for a consumer to revisit an already-searched product.
My data are conditional on search and purchase and I therefore do not model the outside
option of not searching and/or not making a purchase.
3.2 Optimal Consumer Behavior
A consumer searches a product if the marginal benefit of doing so exceeds her marginal
search cost. Since the match values εij follow N (0, σ), prior to search, the utilities uij
follow N (δij, σ). Hereafter, I refer to the dispersion parameter of this distribution (σ) as the
match-value standard deviation, or MVSD for short. Define u∗i as the highest utility among
the searched products thus far.1 Conditional on u∗i , a consumer’s expected marginal benefit
1For the first search, I set u∗i = −∞ since my data are conditional on search.
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from searching product j is given by
Bij =
∫ ∞
u∗i
(uij − u∗i ) fuij (uij) duij
= Pr [εij > u
∗
i − δij]× E
[
εij − (u∗i − δij)
∣∣εij > u∗i − δij] . (3.2)
This marginal benefit is the probability that the realized utility for j, uij, exceeds the
best realized utility among the already searched products, u∗i , multiplied by the expected
value of uij given uij > u
∗
i . As shown in Equation (3.2), the marginal benefit depends on the
MVSD through the integration over the utility distribution fuij (uij). Holding everything else
constant, a (symmetric) distribution with larger variance has more mass in the tails of the
distribution and thus has both a higher probability that the next realized utility will exceed
the currently best realized utility and a larger conditional expected value. Thus quantifying
the MVSD informs me about the magnitude of the marginal benefit from searching.
Weitzman (1979) derived the rules for optimal behavior under sequential search. The
rules involve “reservation utilities” zij, which are the values that equate the marginal cost
and expected marginal benefit of search – that is, zij is the value for u
∗
ij that solves Bij = cij
as in Equation (3.2). Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) show that there is a semi-
closed-form expression for calculating reservation utilities under the assumption of normally
distributed match-values:
cij
σ
= φ(ζij)− ζij × (1− Φ(ζij)) . (3.3)
I follow the approach of Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010) by solving ζij from
the implicit function expressed in Equation (3.3), and then calculating reservation utilities
as:
zij = δij + ζij × σ. (3.4)
Next, I formally state the optimal sequential search rules developed in Weitzman (1979).
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Because the rank of the reservation utilities is a one-to-one mapping with the product index
j, I cast the model using j as the order of the reservation utilities such that j = 1 is the
product with the highest reservation utility for the consumer and j = Ji for the product with
the lowest reservation utility. Let me denote the number of searches made by a consumer as
Ki. For notational simplicity, I drop the consumer-specific subscript i for the remainder of
this section.
Three rules govern consumer search and purchase behavior:
1. Selection Rule: A consumer searches products in a decreasing order of reservation
utilities, i.e.,
z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . . ≥ zK ≥ max
l>K
{zl} . (3.5)
2. Stopping Rule: A consumer stops searching when the maximum realized utility among
the searched products is larger than the maximum reservation utility among the un-
searched products, i.e.,
max
h≤K
{uh} ≥ max
l>K
{ul} . (3.6)
Equivalently, at each step during the search process, when a consumer decides to
continue searching, the opposite of the Stopping Rule must hold, i.e.,
max
h<k
{uh} < zk ∀k = 2, . . . , K. (3.7)
3. Choice Rule: A consumer purchases the product with the highest realized utility among
those searched, i.e.,
uj∗ = arg max
h≤K
{uh} . (3.8)
To understand the implementation of the Weitzman (1979) rules, it can be instructive
to walk through an example. Consider again the consumer Mary from Round Rock, Texas.
There are 7 dealerships within the Mary’s searchable radius carrying in inventory vehicles
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of the class for which she is searching. Mary begins by sorting these dealerships in descend-
ing order according to their reservation utilities zij, which are determined by equating the
expected benefit of searching each dealership with the cost of visiting it. (See Table 3.1;
the values in this example are invented.) Mary then searches the top-rated dealership by
reservation utility, First Texas Honda. She receives a (poor) match value of −2.7, which
when combined with the pre-search observable value of utility of 9.9, yields a realized utility
value of 6.2. Because this realized utility value is lower than the next-best reservation utility
value, she searches that next-best dealership, Round Rock Toyota. From this second search,
she receives a match value of −3.3 and a realized utility value of 6.7. On the same logic, she
continues to search, making her third search at Round Rock Honda. She receives a match
value of −2.5 which yields a realized utility value of 7.5. Now, unlike the prior searches,
Mary’s largest realized utility value (7.5) exceeds the next-best reservation utility value (7.1)
and so she stops searching. She purchases the vehicle with the highest realized utility value,
the 2016 Honda Odyssey from Round Rock Honda.
Table 3.1: Example Consumer Search Process
Rank Year-Make-Model Dealership zij x
′
ijβ εij uij
1 2016 Honda Odyssey First Texas Honda 11.1 9.9 -2.7 6.2
2 2016 Toyota Sienna Round Rock Toyota 10.7 10.0 -3.3 6.7
3 2016 Honda Odyssey Round Rock Honda 9.4 10.0 -2.5 7.5
4 2016 Honda Odyssey Howdy Honda 7.1 8.2 – –
5 2016 Nissan Quest Clay Cooley 6.9 7.1 – –
6 2016 Nissan Quest Round Rock Nissan 5.0 5.0 – –
7 Toyota Sienna Toyota South Austin 4.2 3.3 – –
It is worth noting that Mary was not required to purchase the vehicle from the last-
searched dealership. If her match value draws were (-2, -2, -5) instead of (-2.7, -3.3, -2.5),
then she would still have made three searches, but now she would have purchased from Round
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Rock Toyota, the dealership she searched second. It is also worth noting that negative match
value draws are not necessary for a consumer to continue their search. If Mary’s first match
value draw was 0.5, her realized utility (10.4) would not exceed the next-best reservation
utility (10.7) and so she would continue her search.
3.3 Likelihood Function
The probability that a specific sequence of searches and an ultimate purchase are made by a
consumer is the probability that each of the Weitzman (1979) rules holds at their respective
steps in the consumer’s shopping and purchase process, i.e.,
Li(β,γ, σ;x,d)
= Prob
[
Consumer i selects ji = 1 on the first search,
Continues to search and selects ji = k on the k
th search for k = 2, . . . , Ki,
Stops searching after the Kthi search, and purchases j
∗
i
]
=
∫
1
[
zij ≥ max
h<j
{uh} for j = 2, . . . , Ki
⋂
zij = arg max
k>j
{zik} for j = 1, . . . , Ki
⋂
max
h≤Ki
{uih} ≥ max
k>Ki
{zik}
⋂
uij∗i = arg maxh≤Ki
{uih}
]
dF (η,ε).
(3.9)
The model likelihood is the product of the N individual likelihoods, i.e.,
L (β,γ, σ;x,d) =
N∏
i=1
Li (β,γ, σ;x,d) . (3.10)
Note that I parametrize the MVSD as θ = log (σ) during estimation.
Neither the search nor purchase probabilities can be expressed in closed form. I approxi-
mate the integrals in the likelihood function with averages using logit-smoothed accept-reject
simulation. This simulated maximum likelihood estimation algorithm follows Train (2009).
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Details and R code for estimation are provided in Appendix A.
3.4 Identification
The parameters to be estimated include the preference parameters β, search cost parameters
γ, and the MVSD σ.
The preference parameters β are identified by purchase frequency, search order, and the
number of searches. In much the same way that the purchase decision among a set of products
identifies preference parameters in a traditional discrete choice model, the purchase decision
among searched products identifies preference parameters in a search model. In addition,
because consumers search in order of decreasing reservation utilities (recall, zij = δij+ζij×σ),
holding everything else constant, products with higher δij have higher reservation utility
values and thus are ranked higher by search order and searched more frequently.
Identification of the search cost parameters γ depends on the specification of the search
cost function and the parametric assumptions of the model. With no exogenous search cost
shifter (e.g., with fixed cost of search) and no parametric assumption for the distribution of
ε, only the ratio of c/σ can be identified. The reason is that only the number of searches
informs c and σ, but the search order does not. To see this, recall that consumers search in
decreasing order of reservation utilities which are a function of search cost and the MVSD
σ (see Equation (3.4) reproduced in the paragraph above). If there is a common search cost
across products and a common MVSD, then ζij is the same for all products and the search
order is entirely driven by δij.
Conversely, without an exogenous search cost shifter but with a parametric assumption
on the match value distribution, search cost c and MVSD σ are separately identified by
parametric form. This can be seen in the implicit function of Equation (3.3): cij/σ =
φ(ζij)− ζij × (1− Φ(ζij)). If σ were only part of the left-hand side, then c and σ would not
be separately identified, i.e., only their ratio would be parametrically identified, as discussed
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above. However, σ is also part of the right-hand side of Equation (3.3) because ζij =
(zij−δij)/σ and this ensures parametric identification. In practice, despite making parametric
assumptions on the match value distribution, previous empirical research has commonly fixed
σ to 1 and only estimated c (e.g., Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg 2010, Chen and Yao
2017, Honka and Chintagunta 2017, Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg 2017, Ursu 2018).
The results of my simulation study, presented next, suggest that substantial data would be
required to estimate c and σ when no cost shifter is present, and thus potentially rationalize
the choice by prior researchers to fix σ to 1.
By contrast, with an exogenous search cost shifter and a parametric assumption on the
match value distribution, (i.e., distance to dealerships in my empirical application), both
the search cost cij (and its governing parameters γ) and the MVSD σ can be separately
identified. The reason is that both the number of searches and the search order inform c and
σ which, in turn, influence reservation utilities (see Equation (3.4)). For example, higher
search costs yield lower ζij values. Thus a consumer who must incur higher cost to search
a product will assign it a lower reservation utility, rank it lower in the search order, and
stop her search earlier (on average) than an otherwise identical consumer facing an identical
searchable set of products but with lower search cost. Thus the observable differences in
search cost due to the exogenous search cost shifter (coupled with the patterns of search
order and search length) identify the search cost parameters γ.
Lastly, a higher MVSD (σ) assigns a larger value to the second component of the reser-
vation utility (see Equation (3.4)) by increasing the mass in the upper tail of the utility
distribution. With a larger MVSD, search terminates later because, holding everything else
constant, a larger MVSD results in a higher marginal benefit from an additional search (see
Equation (3.2) and Figure 3.1 below) and thus higher reservation utilities increase the prob-
ability that consumers continue searching. As a result, the MVSD is identified by the extent
to which the search order is driven by variance (rather than the mean) of the distribution of
utility.
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3.5 Simulation Study
In this section, I describe the results from a simulation study in which I demonstrate that my
estimation approach recovers preference and cost parameters as well as the MVSD parameter
if an exogenous search cost shifter is included in the estimation.
For the simulation study, I generate 5,000 consumers each searching up to five brands.
The number of searchable dealerships is drawn from a combination of a chi-squared dis-
tribution and an exponential distribution so as to generally mimic the observed searchable
set sizes in the empirical application. These simulated searchable set sizes range from 1 to
40 with a median of 11 and a mean of 12. Observable characteristics include the brand as
well as price and city mileage; the latter two are drawn from uniform distributions on the
interval −2 to 2. Distances to dealerships are drawn from the absolute value of the sum of
a chi-squared distribution with 8 degrees of freedom and a normal distribution with mean
zero and standard deviation 16. See Appendix B for the R code used for simulation.
Simulated distances to the searchable alternatives range from 0.01 miles to 102.4 miles
with a median of 15.5 and a mean of 18.2 miles. For estimation, I use 1,000 draws from
the distributions of the consumers’ idiosyncratic preferences and match-value terms and
smoothing parameters of (15, 15, 15, 5). I replicate each estimation 50 times and report
mean coefficient estimates, their standard deviation, and average standard errors. The results
are shown in Table 3.3a and show that, for a search model, the parameters are recovered
well.
For a point of comparison, I repeat the exercise without a search cost shifter. The results
are presented in Table 3.3b. Although the cost and benefit parameters are parametrically
identified, they are estimated imprecisely here. For example, the search cost intercept has
an asymptotic standard error greater than 10. Significantly more data would be required to
obtain accurate estimates. A comparison of these two simulation results highlights the value
that a search cost shifter can bring to the estimation of a sequential search model.
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Table 3.2: Simulation Study
(a) With Exogenous Cost Shifter
Average Standard Deviation Average Asymptotic
True Values Estimate of Estimates Standard Error
Brand 1 0.2 0.178 0.088 0.038
Brand 2 0.4 0.374 0.064 0.045
Brand 3 0.6 0.540 0.066 0.042
Brand 4 0.8 0.714 0.080 0.038
MSRP -0.5 -0.443 0.023 0.012
MPG 0.5 0.445 0.023 0.011
Cost Intercept -2.0 -2.623 0.167 0.078
Distance 0.3 0.347 0.015 0.007
Log Sigma 0.69 0.439 0.059 0.024
(b) Without Exogenous Cost Shifter
Average Standard Deviation Average Asymptotic
True Values Estimate of Estimates Standard Error
Brand 1 0.2 0.177 0.055 0.027
Brand 2 0.4 0.344 0.057 0.030
Brand 3 0.6 0.522 0.055 0.025
Brand 4 0.8 0.689 0.056 0.027
MSRP -0.5 -0.429 0.016 0.008
MPG 0.5 0.428 0.014 0.008
Cost Intercept 0 -20.900 6.499 10.983
Log Sigma 0.69 -3.976 0.309 0.386
Note for both tables: Simulations based on 50 repetitions of 5,000 consumers search-
ing 5 brands. Estimations uses 1,000 draws to approximate the integral over idiosyn-
cratic preferences and match-value terms. Smoothing parameter vector set to λ =
(15, 15, 15, 5).
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In addition, to illustrate the relationship between the MVSD and optimal search behavior,
I simulate five additional groups of data sets. Each group contains 50 replications and the
data generation process follows what is outlined above. However, across all generated data
sets, I hold all characteristics constant except for the MVSD. The MVSD is parameterized
as log(σ) and set to the following values for each group of data sets, respectively: log(2), 2,
5, 10, and 25. Using these values, I simulate the number of searches a consumer makes when
optimally searching sequentially using the Weitzman (1979) rules and then I average across
the 50 replications. The five average search-length distributions (where I average across sets
of 50 replications) are shown in Figure 3.1 with red bars to indicate mean values. The figure
shows that an increase in the MVSD yields an increase in the average number of searches and
results in a search-length distribution with a longer tail. These results support the argument
above that the number of searches helps identify the MVSD, and will be a useful reference
when discussing model fit in Section 4.1.
3.6 Empirical Results
I show the results from three search model specifications in Table 3.4. In model (i), I fix the
MVSD to 1 and estimate a fixed cost of search. In model (ii), I continue to fix the MVSD to
1, but allow search cost to vary with distance, an urban dummy, and an interaction between
both variables. In model (iii), I allow the MVSD σ to enter the model as a parameter to
be estimated. In all three model specifications, I include the same set of covariates as in
the reduced-form choice models in Section 2.4. Across the three model specifications, the
utility parameter estimates are similar, generally sharing the same sign, similar magnitude,
and significance with the exception of the brand intercepts for Nissan and Toyota. The
utility parameter estimates also generally similar to the results from the reduced-form choice
models presented in Table 2.4.
Comparing models (i) and (ii) in Table 3.4, the addition of distance, an urban dummy,
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Figure 3.1: Simulated Search Patterns for Various Values of the Match Value
Standard Deviation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
log(sigma) = log(2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
log(sigma) = 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
log(sigma) = 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
log(sigma) = 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
log(sigma) = 20
Note: For each value of log(σ), 50 data sets are simulated. The search-length distribution is tabulated
for each data set, and then averaged across the 50 data sets. That average is then plotted. The proce-
dure is repeated for each value of log(σ). Red vertical bars indicate the average search length.
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Table 3.4: Search Model Results
Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Preference Parameters
MSRP (in $10,000) −0.182∗∗ 0.018 −0.186∗∗ 0.019 −0.202∗∗ 0.020
Chevrolet −0.807∗∗ 0.035 −0.787∗∗ 0.034 −0.803∗∗ 0.038
Ford −0.602∗∗ 0.037 −0.579∗∗ 0.039 −0.578∗∗ 0.040
Nissan −0.068∗∗ 0.038 −0.063 0.040 −0.073 0.039
Toyota 0.047 0.031 0.072∗∗ 0.030 0.097∗∗ 0.033
Large Vehicle x Chevrolet 0.611∗∗ 0.059 0.611∗∗ 0.060 0.670∗∗ 0.066
Large Vehicle x Ford 0.886∗∗ 0.056 0.823∗∗ 0.060 1.020∗∗ 0.064
Large Vehicle x Toyota 0.028 0.053 0.011 0.054 0.046 0.058
Horsepower (in 100) −0.473∗∗ 0.030 −0.501∗∗ 0.031 −0.518∗∗ 0.034
Engine Size 0.132∗∗ 0.019 0.146∗∗ 0.018 0.151∗∗ 0.021
MPG 0.042∗∗ 0.005 0.042∗∗ 0.006 0.044∗∗ 0.006
MPG x Large Vehicle 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004
Log Search Cost Parameters
Intercept 0.361∗∗ 0.018 0.273∗∗ 0.043 2.250∗∗ 0.040
Urban 0.203∗∗ 0.048 −0.055∗∗ 0.015
Distance (in Miles) 0.017∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗ 0.000
Urban x Distance 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.000
Match-Value Standard Deviation
Sigma 1.00 1.00 8.16 0.310
Number of Consumers 6, 511 6, 511 6, 511
Number of Products 175, 840 175, 840 175, 840
Log-Likelihood −20, 765 −18, 362 −17, 652
BIC 41, 645 36, 872 35, 453
Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. The base brand is Honda. Opti-
mization via BFGS with relative tolerance convergence criterion set to 1e-6. Simulated likelihood using Q=1,000
independent random draws of the random utility error and the match-value distribution. Search costs are pa-
rameterized as cij = exp{γ0 + γ1Urban + γ2Distance + γ3Urban × Distance}. Delta Method used to cal-
culate standard error of σ. BIC = log(6511) × k − 2 × LL where k is the estimated number of parame-
ters.
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and an interaction between both variables to the search cost function leads to a much larger
log-likelihood value (a change of over 2,400). This improvement is driven by a better ability
of the model to fit the search order during the estimation process because consumers tend
to visit dealerships close to their homes. When distance is not included in the model, two
dealerships are equivalent from a modeling perspective if they offer a vehicle with the same
characteristics even if one dealership is located next to the consumer’s home and the other
dealership is located 100 miles away. All search cost parameter estimates are positive and
statistically significant. Comparing urban and rural consumers, urban consumers face higher
cost than rural consumers, and that cost difference increases with distance. For example,
the cost (in utils) to a rural consumer to visit a dealership 1 mile away is 1.34, while the
cost to an urban consumer to do the same is 1.64 (23% higher). At a distance of 20 miles,
the rural consumer’s cost is 1.43 and the urban consumer’s cost is 1.77 (28% higher).
In model (iii), my main model, I additionally estimate the MVSD. The improvement of
over 700 in the log-likelihood is large and shows that model (iii) fits the data better than
model (ii). In addition, the correlation between log (σ) and the search cost intercept is 0.95.
If a correlation between two parameters equals ±1.0, then those two parameters are not
separate identified. While this value is high, it is not high enough to suggest concern for
identification. The correlations between all other estimated coefficients lie within ±0.8 with
most being smaller than ±0.4. See Table 3.5.
Moreover, lack of identification between parameters would be observable as a ridge in the
log-likelihood – that is, a region with equivalent likelihood values. In Figures 3.2a and 3.2b,
I show bivariate plots of the log-likelihood in the space of the search cost intercept (γ0) and
the MVSD (σ) at two scales of perspective. (The white area in the contour plots contain log-
likelihood values that are worse than the dark blue area.) The plots show no ridge. Rather,
there is a unimodal mountain with a unique maximum, indicating the separate identification
of these parameters.2
2Simulation error and smoothing are two potential concerns with the evidence shown for parametric
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Figure 3.2: Log-Likelihood Bivariate Contour Plots
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The MVSD estimate is 8.16. This estimate is large compared to the common practice of
setting σ to 1. This large MVSD estimate indicates that consumers gain substantial benefits
when visiting car dealerships. The MVSD has an estimated standard error of 0.31 and a
95% confidence interval (3.88, 17.19).3 Note that the interval does not include 1.
The parameter estimates for model (iii) also indicate that fixing the MVSD to 1 imposes
a bias on the other parameters, in particular, on the cost parameters. More specifically,
I find that the cost intercept is smaller, the urban intercept has a different sign, and the
coefficient on distance is estimated to be almost three times as large in model (ii) as in
model (iii). To demonstrate the differences visually, in Figure 3.3, I plot cij/σ for a rural
consumer over distances ranging from 0 to 100 miles for all three search models. The cij/σ
value is substantially different between model (ii) and (iii) for almost all positive distances.
Thus I conclude that it is important to estimate the MVSD to correctly recover search cost
parameters.
identification. Regarding simulation error, I use 1,000 draws in the estimation, a much larger number of
draws that in previous literature. In addition, I have re-estimated the model using 10,000 draws and found
the coefficient estimates and log-likelihood values to barely change. This leads me to conclude that simulation
error is not a concern. Regarding smoothing, I have also estimated the model using smoothing factor λ set
to 6, 7, and 8, and confirmed that the bivariate (cost intercept and MVSD) log-likelihood contour plots show
only a unimodal mountain, leading me to conclude that smoothing is not a concern for identification.
3I use the Delta Method to calculate the standard error for σˆ. Specifically, I estimate θ = log(σ). Thus,
StdErr(σˆ) = exp(θˆ)× StdErr(θˆ).
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of Cost-Sigma Ratio vs Distance
Across Fitted Search Models
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CHAPTER 4
Post-Estimation Analyses
4.1 Model Fit
I evaluate the in-sample predictive performance of the estimated models using several mea-
sures. First, in Table 4.1a, I show the product and brand hit rates for four models: full
information multinomial logit model (model (b) in Table 2.4) and the three search models
(models (i) to (iii) in Table 3.4). The “hit rate” is the percent of time that simulated behavior
matches observed behavior. For example, the product hit rate is the average percent of time
that the simulated-to-be-purchased product is the same as the actually purchased product.
I calculate the hit rates as follows: for each consumer, I simulate 500 vectors of the random
utility errors ηi. For each simulation, I calculate the consumer’s reservation utilities for each
searchable product and allow search and choice to progress following Weitzman (1979) rules.
For each consumer and each simulation, I record the predicted search length, the searched
product(s), and the chosen product as well as its brand.
The results show that all three search models considerably outperform the multinomial
logit model (model (b) in Table 2.4). Among the three search models, added flexibility yields
better hit rates. The improvement is the largest when search costs are modeled as a function
of distance and the urban dummy (model (ii) in Table 3.4); the improvement in brand hit
rate is marginal when the MVSD is estimated (model (iii) in Table 3.4).
Additionally, Table 4.1b displays the distribution of the number of searches consumers
make (observed in my data) and the distributions of the number of searches that are predicted
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Table 4.1: In-Sample Predictive Performance
(a) Hit Rates
Hit Rates in % Model (b) Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii)
Product Hit Rate 8.4 10.3 14.9 19.4
Brand Hit Rate 30.0 39.4 39.8 39.9
(b) Search Distributions
Observed Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii)
Number of Searches (Data) (Predicted) (Predicted) (Predicted)
1 91.1% 96.2% 98.7% 88.5%
2 7.8% 3.7% 1.3% 10.3%
3 0.9% 0.1% 0.1% 1.1%
4 0.2% - - 0.1%
5 0.1% - - 0.1%
6+ 0.1% - - -
by the three search models from Table 3.4. While allowing search cost to vary with search cost
shifters (model (ii)) enables the model to more precisely predict which products (dealerships)
consumers search, model (ii) does not predict the distribution of the number of searches well:
it overpredicts the proportion of consumers who search once and underpredicts the proportion
of consumers who make two or more searches, i.e., the tail of the distribution of the number
of searches. While the maximum number of searches consumers conduct is 6 in my data,
model (ii) predicts that the maximum number of searches is 3. Model (iii) – in which the
MVSD is estimated – provides by far the best fit to the observed distribution of number
of searches. In other words, permitting the MVSD to be freely estimated allows the model
to fit the data better – in particular, the tail of the distribution of the number of searches.
Model (iii) predicts the maximum number of searches to be 5, while the maximum number
of search in my data is 6.
To summarize, my results show that estimating the MVSD is beneficial to correctly
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predict product choice and crucial to correctly predict the distribution of the number of
searches, especially the tail of the search distribution.
4.2 Price Elasticities
I show the implied own-price elasticities for all three search models in Table 4.2. Elasticities
are calculated by first simulating search and choice behavior from the fitted model. Then,
separately for each brand, I increase the prices of available alternatives by 10% and re-
simulate search and choice behavior. I repeat this exercise 500 times for each consumer.
Elasticities are computed as the average difference in percent brand choice between the
simulated outcomes with and without a price increase, scaled to reflect a 1% price increase.
Table 4.2: Own-Price Elasticities
Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii)
Chevrolet −0.79 −0.78 −0.75
Ford −0.69 −0.68 −0.67
Honda −0.52 −0.58 −0.56
Nissan −0.72 −0.72 −0.71
Toyota −0.62 −0.63 −0.60
The own-price elasticity estimates range from -0.6 to -0.8. The elasticity estimates are
influenced by the assumption that consumers make search and purchase decisions only among
5 brands and conditional on having already selected the type of vehicle they will purchase.
While these assumptions were useful in easing the computational burden of fitting the model,
they restrict the interpretability of the elasticity estimates because, for example, consumers
may substitute to other brands of the same Edmunds type and, at some level of price increase,
consumers will likely not simply substitute to other vehicles in the same Edmunds type, but
will substitute to other vehicle types.
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To the extent that managerial pricing decisions are driven by elasticity estimates, the
consistency of the estimates across models suggests that, for pricing decisions, there is little
benefit of including the MVSD in the model. However, as discussed and explored in Section
4.4, there are other non-pricing benefits.
4.3 Consumer Surplus
While the MVSD is a direct measure of the magnitude of potential benefits achievable
through search, I also calculate expected consumer surplus as an alternative measure of
achieved benefits through search. For an individual consumer, the consumer surplus is
defined as the expected utility from the chosen product net of all costs (price and search
costs), i.e.,
E [CSi] =
∫
ε
∫
η
(
uij∗ −
Ki∑
j=1
cij
)
dF (η) dF (ε). (4.1)
Note that, because I do not model the no-search and no-purchase decisions as a result
of the fact that my data are conditional on search and on purchase, my consumer surplus
estimates taking both prices and search costs into account can be negative (see, e.g., Moraga-
Gonzalez, Sandor, and Wildenbeest 2017). In particular, because I do not model an outside
option, utility values from my model are interval (not ratio) values – that is, utility values
are relative to each other, but do not have a fixed point (e.g., a zero utility value) and thus
may be “shifted” when compared to a similar model that includes the outside options of
no-search and/or no-purchase. To calculate consumer surplus for a consumer, I simulate
500 realizations from a model and average the resulting consumer surplus estimates for each
consumer:
ĈSi =
1
Q
 Q∑
q=1
uqij∗ − K
q
i∑
j=1
cqij
 . (4.2)
Figure 4.1 shows the distributions of consumer surplus from models (ii) and (iii). The
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mean consumer surplus estimates for models (ii) and (iii) are -0.7 and -8.0, respectively.
Thus normalizing the MVSD to 1 severely overstates consumer surplus.
Figure 4.1: Consumer Surplus Based on Models (ii) and (iii)
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To assess the relationship between consumer surplus and consumer characteristics, the
consumer surplus from model (iii) is regressed on a set of consumer demographics. The results
are displayed in Table 4.3. The included demographic variables explain a large proportion
of the variation in the consumer surplus, i.e. 38.5%. I find significantly larger consumer
surplus for urban and non-white consumers and significantly smaller consumer surplus for
older consumers and consumers with kids.
4.4 Counterfactual
In 2017, Hyundai initiated a program called “Hyundai Drive” in which a consumer can
schedule a test drive of a Hyundai vehicle at a location that is convenient to her and a dealer
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Table 4.3: Consumer Surplus and Demographics
(1) (2)
Urban Indicator 0.836∗∗ 0.717∗∗
(0.022) (0.029)
Median Age 30 - 40 −0.011 −0.063∗∗
(0.024) (0.024)
Median Age 40 + −0.103∗∗ −0.135∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
Percent Male −0.053 −0.048
(0.181) (0.172)
log(Number of Kids) −0.069∗∗ −0.081∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Percent with College Degree 0.236∗∗ −0.031
(0.052) (0.052)
log(Income in $1,000) 0.015∗∗ 0.001
(0.008) (0.007)
Unemployment Rate 0.233 0.167
(0.210) (0.204)
Percent Black 0.670∗∗ 0.329∗∗
(0.070) (0.073)
Percent Other Race 0.960∗∗ 0.684∗∗
(0.081) (0.082)
Intercept −8.862∗∗ −8.137∗∗
(0.130) (0.136)
Month Fixed Effects No Yes
County Fixed Effects No Yes
Number of Observations 6,511 6,511
R2 0.276 0.385
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the 95% confidence level.
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will bring the car to that location. This program reduces travel costs to a dealer, but does
not eliminate all search costs as it takes time to perform a test drive and there continue to
be mental costs of considering an additional alternative. Here, I assess the potential market
share changes to each brand from adopting at-home test drives as well as the search and
purchase-conditional-on-search decisions that lead to market share changes.
To do so, I first assume that brands adopt at-home test drives unilaterally. The brand
offering the program permits the consumer to select a vehicle from that brand’s closest
dealership to be brought to the consumer for inspection and a test drive. Thus, the consumer
incurs no travel costs to “visit” that dealership. To calculate the impact of adopting at-home
test drives, I first simulate search and choice behavior for each consumer 500 times. Then,
for each brand, I set the distance of the closest dealership for each consumer to zero and
re-simulate search and choice behavior. I then calculate the average differences in search,
choice, and choice conditional on search between the base simulation to the counterfactual
simulation. Results are presented in Table 4.4 where the top half of the table report results
under Model (iii) estimates while the bottom half reports results under Model (ii) estimates.
Unilateral implementation of at-home tests drives permits brands to capture an additional
3.9–7.7 percentage points of the analyzed market. Because the five brands under study
account for 60.1% of the Texas auto market, this corresponds to overall market share changes
of 2.3–4.6 percentage points (holding constant the choices made by consumers who purchase
other brands). This program yields the smallest market share increases for Chevrolet and
Nissan and the largest market share increase for Toyota.
As a point of comparison, I conduct the same exercise with the estimates from model
(ii) in which the MVSD is fixed to 1. I find the results to be roughly half as large as those
from model (iii) in which the MVSD is estimated. Specifically, estimated increases in market
shares under model (ii) range from 0.8 to 1.6 percentage points. Thus, failing to estimate
MVSD yields underestimated market share increases from the unilateral implementation of
at-home test drives.
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I then assess three additional counterfactuals. In the first two, two brands implement at
home test drives simultaneously. In the first, Chevrolet and Ford implement at-home test
drives, while in the second, Honda and Toyota implement them. In the final counterfactual,
all five brands implement at-home test drives simultaneously. Results are presented in Tables
4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.
There are consistent patterns in the results across the counterfactuals. First, the average
number of searches increases as more brands implement at-home test drives. Under the base-
line simulation, consumers make 1.129 searches on average. This increases to 1.131–1.133
when one brand unilaterally implements; to 1.134–1.135 when there is bilateral implemen-
tation; and finally to 1.140 when all brands simultaneously implement. The implementing
brand(s) increase their probability of being searched, but realize a decrease in the proba-
bility of purchase given search. However, increased search more than offsets the decreased
conditional purchase probability, yielding an increase in market share in all but the last
counterfactual. In the last counterfactual, all brands simultaneously implement at-home
test drives and since not all brands can simultaneously increase market share, I find instead
that foreign brands (Honda, Nissan, and Toyota) are able to gain market share at the expense
of domestic brands (Chevrolet and Ford).
In addition, all counterfactual results indicate that model (ii) underestimates the effects
of at-home test drives relative to market share predictions from model (iii). The disparity in
predictions highlights the importance of including the MVSD as a parameter to be estimated
in the sequential search model, as the failure to do so leads to incorrect estimates of search
cost parameters, which translate into incorrect results of counterfactual analyses that affect
consumers’ search costs. In the counterfactuals presented here, manipulation of the distance
a consumer must incur to inspect a vehicle changes her search cost, which impact how she will
search and ultimately the what she will purchase. Thus, accurately assessing her sensitivity
to the distance component of search cost is vital to predicting her behavior.
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Table 4.4: Unilateral Adoption of At-Home Test Drives
Brand Adopting No At-Home With At-Home Change in
At-Home Test Drives Test Drives Test Drives Percent
Model (iii)
Market Share
Honda 0.145 0.194 34.2%
Chevrolet 0.200 0.247 23.4%
Ford 0.286 0.338 18.0%
Nissan 0.093 0.132 41.3%
Toyota 0.276 0.353 28.0%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.163 0.221 35.4%
Chevrolet 0.225 0.281 24.4%
Ford 0.323 0.384 18.8%
Nissan 0.106 0.151 42.7%
Toyota 0.311 0.402 29.0%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.904 0.896 -0.9%
Chevrolet 0.903 0.898 -0.6%
Ford 0.911 0.907 -0.5%
Nissan 0.897 0.886 -1.2%
Toyota 0.909 0.903 -0.7%
Model (ii)
Market Share
Honda 0.148 0.164 11.3%
Chevrolet 0.198 0.211 6.4%
Ford 0.283 0.298 5.1%
Nissan 0.096 0.109 13.8%
Toyota 0.275 0.302 9.8%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.149 0.167 11.9%
Chevrolet 0.201 0.214 6.8%
Ford 0.287 0.303 5.5%
Nissan 0.097 0.111 14.4%
Toyota 0.279 0.307 10.3%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.990 0.985 -0.5%
Chevrolet 0.988 0.985 -0.3%
Ford 0.989 0.987 -0.3%
Nissan 0.988 0.982 -0.6%
Toyota 0.990 0.986 -0.4%
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Table 4.5: Chevrolet and Ford Adopt At-Home Test Drives
No At-Home With At-Home Change in
Brand Test Drives Test Drives Percent
Model (iii)
Market Share
Honda 0.145 0.131 -9.1%
Chevrolet 0.200 0.224 11.7%
Ford 0.286 0.313 9.3%
Nissan 0.093 0.084 -9.8%
Toyota 0.276 0.248 -10.1%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.163 0.149 -9.1%
Chevrolet 0.225 0.254 12.6%
Ford 0.323 0.356 10.2%
Nissan 0.106 0.095 -9.7%
Toyota 0.311 0.280 -10.0%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.904 0.903 -0.2%
Chevrolet 0.903 0.896 -0.8%
Ford 0.911 0.904 -0.8%
Nissan 0.897 0.895 -0.2%
Toyota 0.909 0.907 -0.2%
Model (ii)
Market Share
Honda 0.148 0.144 -2.3%
Chevrolet 0.198 0.204 3.0%
Ford 0.283 0.291 2.6%
Nissan 0.096 0.093 -2.7%
Toyota 0.275 0.268 -2.7%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.149 0.146 -2.3%
Chevrolet 0.201 0.208 3.4%
Ford 0.287 0.296 3.0%
Nissan 0.097 0.095 -2.7%
Toyota 0.279 0.271 -2.7%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.990 0.990 0.0%
Chevrolet 0.988 0.985 -0.3%
Ford 0.990 0.987 -0.3%
Nissan 0.988 0.987 0.0%
Toyota 0.990 0.990 0.0%
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Table 4.6: Honda and Toyota Adopt At-Home Test Drives
No At-Home With At-Home Change in
Brand Test Drives Test Drives Percent
Model (iii)
Market Share
Honda 0.145 0.172 19.2%
Chevrolet 0.200 0.172 -14.0%
Ford 0.286 0.247 -13.7%
Nissan 0.093 0.081 -13.8%
Toyota 0.276 0.328 19.0%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.163 0.197 20.4%
Chevrolet 0.225 0.194 -14.1%
Ford 0.323 0.279 -13.6%
Nissan 0.106 0.091 -13.7%
Toyota 0.311 0.374 20.0%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.904 0.894 -1.1%
Chevrolet 0.903 0.901 -0.3%
Ford 0.911 0.908 -0.3%
Nissan 0.897 0.895 -0.3%
Toyota 0.909 0.901 -0.9%
Model (ii)
Market Share
Honda 0.148 0.157 6.6%
Chevrolet 0.198 0.188 -5.2%
Ford 0.283 0.269 -5.0%
Nissan 0.096 0.092 -4.5%
Toyota 0.275 0.294 6.9%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.149 0.160 7.2%
Chevrolet 0.201 0.190 -5.2%
Ford 0.287 0.273 -5.0%
Nissan 0.097 0.093 -4.5%
Toyota 0.279 0.299 7.4%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.990 0.985 -0.5%
Chevrolet 0.998 0.988 0.0%
Ford 0.990 0.989 0.0%
Nissan 0.988 0.988 0.0%
Toyota 0.990 0.986 -0.4%
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Table 4.7: All Brands Simultaneously Adopt At-Home Test Drives
No At-Home With At-Home Change in
Brand Test Drives Test Drives Percent
Model (iii)
Market Share
Honda 0.145 0.156 8.1%
Chevrolet 0.200 0.188 -5.9%
Ford 0.286 0.263 -8.1%
Nissan 0.093 0.104 11.5%
Toyota 0.276 0.288 4.6%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.163 0.179 9.3%
Chevrolet 0.225 0.214 -5.1%
Ford 0.323 0.299 -7.3%
Nissan 0.106 0.119 12.8%
Toyota 0.311 0.329 5.6%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.904 0.892 -1.4%
Chevrolet 0.903 0.893 -1.1%
Ford 0.911 0.900 -1.2%
Nissan 0.897 0.883 -1.4%
Toyota 0.909 0.897 -1.1%
Model (ii)
Market Share
Honda 0.148 0.153 3.4%
Chevrolet 0.198 0.191 -3.3%
Ford 0.283 0.272 -3.9%
Nissan 0.096 0.101 5.3%
Toyota 0.275 0.283 2.7%
Probability of Search
Honda 0.149 0.155 3.9%
Chevrolet 0.201 0.195 -2.9%
Ford 0.287 0.277 -3.5%
Nissan 0.097 0.103 5.9%
Toyota 0.279 0.288 3.2%
Probability of Purchase Conditional on Search
Honda 0.990 0.985 0.5%
Chevrolet 0.988 0.984 0.4%
Ford 0.990 0.986 0.3%
Nissan 0.988 0.981 0.6%
Toyota 0.990 0.985 0.5%
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future Research
Prior to the Internet, store visits and the physical inspection of products played a prominent
role during a consumer’s purchase process – especially for high-ticket durable goods such
as automobiles. Information on prices and vehicle features was difficult to obtain except
via a dealership visit. During the last 15 years, a wealth of online information sources
have provided a low cost alternative to time-consuming dealership visits. Therefore it is an
important empirical question whether dealerships continue to provide (substantial) value to
consumers.
To answer this question, it is necessary to separately quantify both the cost and the
benefit of search. I show that – with an exogenous search cost shifter – both the cost and
the benefit of search can be identified. I estimate a sequential search model for product fit.
My empirical results show that the benefit provided by dealerships to consumers remains
substantial. This finding points to a continuously important role of physical stores in the
age of the Internet. The actions of online retailers in other product categories also corrob-
orate this conclusion. Initially online-only retailers, such as Warby Parker and Bonobos,
have recently opened brick and mortar stores to provide consumers with information that is
difficult to communicate electronically.
My research is not without limitations and offers opportunities for future work. First,
for vehicles not purchased, I observe that a consumer visited a dealership, but not which
specific car the consumer was interested in. This is a limitation of my data. I therefore make
the assumption that the consumer was searching for similar cars across different dealerships.
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The data also do not indicate the set of available vehicles at each dealership, and therefore
I do not model vehicle choice, but only brand-dealer choice (conditional on the type of
vehicle the consumer is interested in). And lastly, the benefit provided by dealers might
be heterogenous, varying with brand, dealership size, or other characteristics. I leave it for
future research to explore this type of heterogeneity.
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APPENDIX A
Estimation Code
Neither the search nor purchase probabilities can be expressed in closed form. I approximate
the integrals in the likelihood function with averages using logit-smoothed accept-reject
simulation. This simulated maximum likelihood estimation algorithm follows Train (2009)
and is outlined in the following steps:
1. Do steps 2–4 for each consumer i = 1, . . . , N
2. Draw Q values from the density fε(ε) for each of the Ki searches for a total of Q ·Ki
draws and draw Q values from the density fη(η) for a total of Q · Ji draws
3. For each set of random draws:
(a) Compute ν1,j = zij −maxh≤j {uih} for j = 2, . . . , Ki
(b) Compute ν2,j = zij −maxk>j {zik} for j = 1, . . . , Ki
(c) Compute ν3 = maxh≤Ki {uih} −maxk>j {zik}
(d) Compute ν4 = uij∗i −maxh≤Ki {uih} for the chosen j∗i
(e) Compute the simulated individual likelihood given one set of draws:
L˜qi =
(
1 +
Ki∑
j=2
e−λ1ν1,j +
Ki∑
j=1
e−λ2ν2,j + e−λ3ν3 + e−λ4ν4
)−1
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4. Average the draw-specific simulated individual likelihoods over the draws:
L˜i =
1
Q
Q∑
q=1
L˜qi
5. Take logs and aggregate the individual-specific likelihoods over individuals to form the
total simulated log-likelihood function:
log
(
L˜
)
=
N∑
i=1
log
(
L˜i
)
Computing time when fitting the sequential search model is directly proportional to the
number of draws used to approximate the integrals in the likelihood function. However,
a large number of draws is necessary to achieve a good approximation. When calculating
each individual likelihood, I therefore use 1, 000 draws for ηij and 1, 000 draws for εij. By
comparison, Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2017) use 40 draws when testing the
kernel-smoothed AR estimation approach; Honka (2014) and Ursu (2018) use 50 draws to
estimate their search models with the same approach.
R code to implement the estimation follows:
# description of data required
# N - scalar number of consumers
# P - scalar number of utility (X) variables
# R - scalar number of cost (d) variables
# params - vector of P beta parameters, R gamma parameters, and the MVSD (sigma_eps)
# datlist - a list of N sublists; each sublist has elements:
# y - length-J_i vector of 0/1 to indicate choice
# x - J_i x P matrix of utility variables
# searched - length-J_i vector of 0/1 to indicate not/searched
# distmat - J_i x R matrix of cost variables
# ndraws - number of draws to approximate integrals
# sigma_eta - eta distributed N(0, sigma_eta^2)
# lambda - length-1 or length-4 vector of logit-smoothing parameters
# seed - permits reproducibility
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# packages required for parallel processing
library(doParallel)
library(foreach)
# function to combine individual likelihoods
LL_ksf <- function(params, datlist, ndraws, sigma_eta, lambda, seed) {
N <- length(datlist)
# calc likelihood by looping over consumers i=1,...,N
ll_vec <- foreach(i=1:N, .combine=c) %dopar% {
L_ksf_i(params, i, datlist[[i]], ndraws, sigma_eta, lambda, seed+i)
}
return(sum(ll_vec))
}
# function to calculate one consumer’s likelihood
L_ksf_i <- function(params, i, dat, ndraws, sigma_eta, lambda, seed) {
## x’beta, cost, etc.
set.seed(seed)
J <- length(dat$searched) # num searchable alts
K <- sum(dat$searched) # num searches made in data
P <- ncol(dat$x) # num x-variables
R <- ncol(dat$distmat) # num cost-variables
beta <- params[1:P]
gamma <- params[P+1:R]
sigma_eps <- exp(params[P+R+1])
xb <- as.vector(dat$x %*% beta)
cost <- as.vector(exp(dat$distmat %*% gamma))
purchased <- which(dat$y == 1)
eta <- matrix(rnorm(J*ndraws, mean=0, sd=sigma_eta), nrow=J, ncol=ndraws)
eps <- matrix(rnorm(J*ndraws, mean=0, sd=sigma_eps), nrow=J, ncol=ndraws)
Vij <- xb + eta
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Uij <- Vij + eps
## zeta & reservation utility
zetafun <- function(zeta, cost, sigma_eps) {
exp(dnorm(zeta, log=T)) -
exp(pnorm(zeta, lower.tail=F, log.p=T))*zeta -
cost/sigma_eps
}
zeta <- rep(NA_real_, length(cost))
zlb <- -1e10; zub <- 6.070461
for(cc in 1:length(cost)) {
zeta[cc] <- uniroot(zetafun, cost=cost[cc], sigma_eps=sigma_eps,
lower=zlb, upper=zub, extendInt="yes",
tol=.Machine$double.eps^0.5,
maxiter=1e6, check.conv=T)$root
}
# reservation utility (dim J x ndraws)
Zij <- Vij + zeta*sigma_eps
## KSF components
# nu1: decision to cont. searching -- z searched > max(u realized)
# nu2: selection of what to search -- z_{h-1} > z_{h} for h=1..K
# nu3: decision to stop searching -- max(u realized) > max(z notsearched)
# nu4: choice of what to purchase -- choose max(u realized)
# if only 1 search
if(K == 1) {
max_z_notsearched <- Rfast::colMaxs(Zij[2:J,], value=T)
nu2 <- Zij[1,] - max_z_notsearched
nu3 <- Uij[1,] - max_z_notsearched
res <- 1/(1 + exp(-lambda[2]*nu2) + exp(-lambda[3]*nu3))
}
# if search everything
if(K > 1 && K == J) {
nu1 <- Zij[-1,,drop=F] - apply(Uij, 2, cummax)[-J,,drop=F]
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nu2 <- Zij[-J,,drop=F] - Zij[-1,,drop=F]
nu4 <- Uij[purchased,,drop=F] - Rfast::colMaxs(Uij[-purchased,,drop=F], value=T)
res <- 1/(1 + colSums(exp(-lambda[1]*nu1)) +
colSums(exp(-lambda[2]*nu2)) +
exp(-lambda[4]*nu4) )
}
# if multiple searches but not complete search
if(K > 1 && K < J) {
nu1 <- Zij[2:K,,drop=F] - apply(Uij, 2, cummax)[1:(K-1),,drop=F]
nu2a <- Zij[1:(K-1),,drop=F] - Zij[2:K,,drop=F]
max_z_notsearched <- apply(Zij[J:1,,drop=F], 2, cummax)[J:1,,drop=F]
nu2b <- Zij[K,] - max_z_notsearched[K+1,]
nu3 <- Rfast::colMaxs(Uij[1:K,,drop=F], value=TRUE) - max_z_notsearched[K+1,]
idx <- c(1:K)[-purchased]
nu4 <- Uij[purchased,] - Rfast::colMaxs(Uij[idx,,drop=F], value=T)
res <- 1/(1 + colSums(exp(-lambda[1]*nu1 )) +
colSums(exp(-lambda[2]*nu2a)) +
exp(-lambda[2]*nu2b) +
exp(-lambda[3]*nu3 ) +
exp(-lambda[4]*nu4 ) )
}
## individual log-likelihood value
return(log(mean(res)))
}
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APPENDIX B
Simulation Code
R code to simulate optimal consumer sequential search behavior according to Weitzman
(1979) is provided below.
# description of elements
# N - Number of consumers
# J_df - scalar number of alternatives, drawn from chisq(df=J_df)+3*exp(1)
# P - scalar number of non-brand X variables
# alpha - vector of alternative-specific intercepts (the first should be zero)
# beta - vector of P coefficients for non-brand X variables
# gamma - vector of 2 search-cost parameters
# x - X var distributed unif[x_min, x_max] where x_m** are length-P vectors
# dist_df - distances are drawn from chisq(df=dist_df)
# eta - component of utility known to consumer, assumed N(0, sigma_eta^2)
# eps - component of utility to search for, assumed N(0, sigma_eps^2)
# seed - permits reproducibility
# function to simulate many consumers
sim_dat_fun <- function(N, J_df, P, alpha, beta, gamma, x_min,
x_max, dist_df, sigma_eta, sigma_eps, seed) {
set.seed(seed)
simdat <- vector(mode="list", length=N)
for(i in 1:N) {
simdat[[i]] <- sim_one_fun(J_df, P, alpha, beta, gamma,
x_min, x_max, dist_df,
sigma_eta, sigma_eps, seed+i)
}
return(simdat)
}
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# function to simulate one consumer
sim_one_fun <- function(J_df, P, alpha, beta, gamma, x_min,
x_max, dist_df, sigma_eta, sigma_eps, seed) {
set.seed(seed)
# draw number of alternatives
J <- ceiling( rchisq(1, df=J_df) + rexp(1)*3 )
# draw brands for each vehicle
brandvec <- sample(1:length(alpha), size=J, replace=T)
x1mat <- matrix(0, nrow=J, ncol=length(alpha))
x1mat[cbind(1:J, brandvec)] <- 1
# draw X vars for each of J vehicles;
x2mat <- t(sapply(rep(P,J), function(x) runif(x, x_min, x_max)))
# calc X’beta
xmat <- cbind(x1mat, x2mat)
if(J==1) xmat <- matrix(xmat, nrow=1)
colnames(xmat) <- c(paste0("brand", 1:length(alpha)), paste0("xvar", 1:P))
xb <- as.vector(xmat %*% c(alpha, beta))
# draw eta_j value for each of J vehicles
eta <- rnorm(J, mean=0, sd=sigma_eta)
# all known utility values to consumer i
delta <- xb + eta
# draw distances
dist <- abs(rchisq(J, df=dist_df) + rnorm(J, mean=0, sd=dist_df*2))
cost <- as.vector( exp( cbind(1, dist) %*% gamma ) )
# calc zeta
zetafun <- function(zeta, cost, sigma_eps) {
exp(dnorm(zeta, log=T)) -
exp(pnorm(zeta, lower.tail=F, log.p=T))*zeta -
cost/sigma_eps
}
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zeta <- rep(NA, length(cost))
zlb <- -1e10; zub <- 6.070461
for(cc in 1:length(cost)) {
zeta[cc] <- uniroot(zetafun, cost=cost[cc], sigma_eps=sigma_eps,
lower=zlb, upper=zub, extendInt="yes",
tol=.Machine$double.eps^0.5,
maxiter=1e6, check.conv=T)$root
}
# reservation utilities
Zij <- delta + zeta*sigma_eps
# get search order (AISO = alts in search order)
ord <- rank(-Zij) # ord=c(3,1,2) means 2nd searched first : B >> C >> A
aiso <- order(ord) # aiso=c(3,1,2) means 3rd searched first : C >> A >> B
# prep for searches
eps <- rep(NA_real_, J)
Uij <- rep(NA_real_, J)
searched <- rep(F,J)
searchnum <- 1
# first search is free
altj <- aiso[searchnum]
eps[altj] <- rnorm(1, mean=0, sd=sigma_eps)
Uij[altj] <- delta[altj] + eps[altj]
searched[altj] <- T
# act optimally according to weitzmann
if(J>1) {
while(max(Uij[searched]) <= max(Zij[!searched])) {
searchnum <- searchnum + 1
altj <- aiso[searchnum]
eps[altj] <- rnorm(1, mean=0, sd=sigma_eps)
Uij[altj] <- delta[altj] + eps[altj]
searched[altj] <- T
if(searchnum == J) break
}
}
return( list(x = xmat[aiso,,drop=F],
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purchased = which(aiso == which.max(Uij)),
searched = searched[aiso],
distmat = cbind(1, dist)[aiso,]) )
}
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